Roy E. Lavallee v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0542, Roy E. Lavallee v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the court on May 11,
2016, issued the following order:

Having considered the brief, memorandum of law, and oral arguments of
the parties, the court concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in
this case. The plaintiff, Roy E. Lavallee, appeals an order of the Superior Court
(Colburn, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), in a declaratory
judgment action in which the plaintiff sought uninsured motorist coverage in
connection with a motor vehicle accident that occurred in November 2013. The
plaintiff argues that, as a passenger in an uninsured vehicle, he is entitled to
uninsured motorist coverage under motor vehicle liability insurance policies
held by his girlfriend and issued to her by State Farm. We affirm.

This case requires us to construe New Hampshire’s uninsured motorist
statute, RSA 264:15, I (Supp. 2015), which provides, in pertinent part, that:

no policy shall be issued . . . with respect to a vehicle registered or
principally garaged in this state, unless coverage is provided
therein or supplemental thereto at least in amounts or limits
prescribed for bodily injury or death for a liability policy under this
chapter, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or drivers of
uninsured motor vehicles.

(Emphasis added.)

The trial court recited the following facts. The plaintiff’s girlfriend owned
two motor vehicles, a Chevrolet Trailblazer and a Chevrolet Monte Carlo, which
were both insured by State Farm motor vehicle liability insurance policies (“the
policies”). The plaintiff was not a named insured on either policy.

In November 2013, the plaintiff was injured when he was a passenger in
an uninsured vehicle that was involved in a collision with another vehicle.
Neither vehicle was owned or operated by the plaintiff or his girlfriend, nor
insured under the girlfriend’s policies. Because the insurance coverage for the
other involved vehicle was not sufficient to fully compensate the plaintiff for his
injuries, he filed an uninsured motorist claim with State Farm seeking
additional compensation. State Farm denied the plaintiff’s claim.
 The plaintiff subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in superior
court, arguing that, “while he is not a named insured or an insured pursuant
to the definitional language of the policy, his status as an added driver makes
him ‘insured thereunder’ as a matter of law” under RSA 264:15, I. (Quotations
and brackets omitted.) The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Although the parties agreed that the plaintiff was not a “named insured” and
did not meet the definition of an “insured” under the policies, there was a
factual dispute as to whether, on the date of the accident, the plaintiff was
listed as a “Household Driver” or an “Assigned Driver” on either policy.
(Quotations and emphases omitted.)

In ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court
assumed, without deciding, “that the plaintiff was identified as a ‘Household
Driver’ or an ‘Assigned Driver’ during the relevant time period.” Nonetheless,
the trial court concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to uninsured motorist
coverage, explaining that merely being listed as a “Household Driver” or an
“Assigned Driver” on a motor vehicle liability insurance policy was insufficient
to establish that he was a “person[] insured thereunder” for purposes of RSA
264:15, I. (Quotations omitted.) Consequently, the trial court granted State
Farm’s motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion.
This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that he is a “person[] insured thereunder”
for purposes of RSA 264:15, I, because, at the time of the accident, he was
listed on the policies as a “[H]ousehold [D]river and/or an [A]ssigned [D]river,”
and an additional premium had been assessed by State Farm and paid. He
argues, therefore, that he is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. He also
asserts that, because he was listed as a “[H]ousehold [D]river and/or an
[A]ssigned [D]river” on the policies, and because State Farm failed to explicitly
exclude him from coverage under the policies, he is entitled to uninsured
motorist coverage.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the record before us is not
sufficient to decide several issues that the plaintiff has raised on appeal. See
Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004) (explaining that it is
the burden of the appealing party to provide this court with a record sufficient
to decide issues on appeal). The plaintiff has failed to provide us with the
policies and renewals at issue, or any billing or payment information. Thus, we
cannot determine whether the premiums increased as a result of the plaintiff
being listed as a “Household Driver” or an “Assigned Driver,” whether the
increased premiums, if any, were paid, or whether any policy exclusions
applied to the plaintiff. Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
he argued to the trial court that he is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage
because State Farm failed to explicitly exclude him from coverage, or because
State Farm increased the premiums. Therefore, we decline to address these
arguments on appeal. See Maplevale Builders v. Town of Danville, 165 N.H.

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99, 106-07 (2013) (declining to address issue because moving party “failed to
provide us with a sufficient record to determine whether it presented its . . .
argument to the trial court”).

Accordingly, the sole question before us is whether the plaintiff — who
purports to be listed on his girlfriend’s policies as a “Household Driver” or an
“Assigned Driver,” and who acknowledges that he is not a named insured — is
nevertheless a “person[] insured thereunder” pursuant to RSA 264:15, I, and,
therefore, entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. Like the trial court, for the
purposes of this analysis, we assume, without deciding, that the plaintiff was
listed on the policies as a “Household Driver” or an “Assigned Driver” at the
time of the accident.

“In reviewing the trial court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary
judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in
its capacity as the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact
exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Am. Fed’n of Teachers – N.H. v. State of N.H., 167 N.H. 294,
300 (2015) (quotation omitted).

Resolving this issue requires us to engage in statutory interpretation.
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.”
State Employees’ Assoc. of N.H. v. State of N.H., 161 N.H. 730, 738 (2011). “In
matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the
legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Id.
“We interpret statutes not in isolation, but in the context of the overall
statutory scheme.” Rivera v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 163 N.H. 603, 607
(2012). We “start with consideration of the plain meaning of the relevant
statutes, construing them, where reasonably possible, to effectuate their
underlying policies.” Id.

The plaintiff argues that RSA 264:15, I, requires uninsured motorist
coverage for persons listed as additional drivers on a motor vehicle liability
insurance policy because those persons qualify as “persons insured
thereunder” pursuant to the statute. RSA 264:15, I. The plaintiff further
argues that the legislature deliberately used the term “persons insured
thereunder” instead of “named insured” or “insureds” to broaden the scope of
individuals who qualify for uninsured motorist coverage. (Quotations and
emphases omitted.)

We have previously observed that “[u]ninsured motorist statutes are
designed to provide an innocent victim a source of restitution when that
injured party cannot recover the full amount of damages from the tortfeasor.”
Rivera, 163 N.H. at 607 (quotation omitted). “Such statutes have been liberally
construed to accomplish their legislative purpose.” Id. However, “[u]ninsured
motorist coverage is not intended to be the only source of insurance for

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individuals. Rather, it is designed to act in concert with already existing
standard liability policies.” Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover, “uninsured
motorist coverage is vehicle related. The legislature has not designed an
insurance scheme that compensates one uninsured motorist for injuries
caused by another uninsured motorist.” Beliveau v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 73, 76 (1980) (citation omitted) (construing former
statute). “Automobile owners who wish to provide themselves with uninsured
motorist coverage in all situations can obtain that coverage by insuring the
vehicles they own.” Id.

RSA 264:15, I, requires that motor vehicle liability insurance policies
provide coverage “for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or drivers of uninsured motor
vehicles.” (Emphasis added.) We have interpreted the phrase “persons insured
thereunder” in RSA 264:15, I, as referring to “insured persons” as defined in
the policy. See Rivera, 163 N.H. at 608 (stating that “‘persons insured’ refers to
a person specified in the insurance policy”); see also Beliveau, 120 N.H. at 75-
76 (construing “persons insured” in New Hampshire’s former uninsured
motorist statute as referring to “the named insured” under the policy). As we
explained in Rivera, “[t]he language of [RSA 264:15, I] makes it clear that the
[uninsured motorist] protection it requires extends only to persons who are
afforded liability coverage under the policy at issue.” Rivera, 163 N.H. at 611;
see Raudonis v. Ins. Co. of North America, 137 N.H. 57, 61 (1993) (stating that
RSA 264:15, I, “requires that a person who is an insured” under a motor
vehicle liability insurance policy “also be covered under the policy’s uninsured
motorist section”).

Thus, contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, our cases establish that the
phrase “persons insured thereunder” in RSA 264:15, I, does not expand
uninsured motorist coverage to persons who are not insured under a given
policy. See Rivera, 163 N.H. at 611. The plaintiff acknowledges that he was
not a named insured and that he did not meet the definition of an insured
under the policies. We therefore conclude that, pursuant to our decisions
discussed above, the plaintiff is not a “person[] insured thereunder” for
purposes of RSA 264:15, I. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err
when it concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to uninsured motorist
coverage.

Affirmed.

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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