2015-0529 Nonprecedential Processed

Michael Gill v. New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration; The Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration

Supreme Court of New Hampshire · Filed April 29, 2016

Opinion text

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0529, Michael Gill v. New Hampshire
Department of Revenue Administration; The Mortgage
Specialists, Inc. v. New Hampshire Department of Revenue
Administration, the court on April 29, 2016, issued the following
order:

Having considered the brief, the memorandum of law, and the record
submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this
case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The plaintiffs, Michael Gill and The Mortgage Specialists, Inc. (MSI), appeal
an order of the Superior Court (Anderson, J.) granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, the New Hampshire Department of Revenue
Administration (DRA), in their appeal from final orders of assessment. We
construe their brief to argue that: (1) “a DRA tax return . . . has been certified as
a forgery. Not even close to my signature”; (2) many people, including members
of the judiciary, the DRA, the Attorney General’s Office, and the bar, have
participated in “corruption”; (3) “every single individual representing the DRA had
a conflict of interest”; (4) “we have extortion, forgery, tax fraud and a criminal
cover up”; and (5) the appeal “will be fraud.”

In reviewing the trial court’s summary judgment rulings, we consider the
affidavits and other evidence, and all inferences properly drawn from them, in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. N.H. Resident Ltd. Partners of
Lyme Timber Co. v. N.H. Dep’t of Revenue Admin., 162 N.H. 98, 101 (2011). If
our review of that evidence discloses no genuine issue of material fact, and if the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the grant of
summary judgment. Id. We review the trial court’s application of the law to the
facts de novo. Id.

The plaintiffs contend that “a DRA tax return” is “a forgery.” To the extent
that they are arguing that they did not sign one or more of their state tax returns,
the record does not establish that they raised this argument before the
commissioner. See RSA 21-J:28-b, IV (2012); Eby v. State, 166 N.H. 321, 343
(2014)
(stating statute limits legal issues to be considered on appeal to those
raised in prior petitions for redetermination and reconsideration before the DRA,
“with the exception that the taxpayer may raise additional legal claims
addressing constitutional issues”). Although Sarah Gill is not a party to this
appeal, we note that the hearing officer directly addressed her argument that she
did not sign the returns. However, the hearing officer concluded that the hearing
officer lacked jurisdiction to address the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding fraud
and malpractice by various of their accountants and attorneys. See RSA 21-J:3,
XVIII (2012) (limiting hearing officer’s jurisdiction on appeals). From this we infer
that the plaintiffs did not argue to the hearing officer that they did not sign the
returns.

Furthermore, the hearing officer’s order referred to plaintiff Gill’s
allegations that he “reasonably relied on the advice of [his] tax advisors” and that
his former accountant “made errors with respect to the reporting of the transfer
of funds, and that subsequent legal counsel and accountants did not make
corrections.” The hearing officer’s order referred to plaintiff MSI’s arguments that
there were “errors in the returns by the return preparer” and that “it used an out
of state preparer who did not understand the scope and complexity of the
business, or the laws of New Hampshire.” We infer from these arguments that
the plaintiffs, unlike Ms. Gill, did not contend before the hearing officer that they
had not signed the returns.

As the appealing parties, the plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s order, the plaintiffs’ challenges to it, the relevant law,
and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the plaintiffs have not
demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Conboy and Lynn, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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