State of New Hampshire v. Nancy Watkins

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0521, State of New Hampshire v. Nancy
Watkins, the court on August 22, 2016, issued the following
order:

Having considered the defendant’s brief and reply brief, the State’s
memorandum of law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that
oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The defendant, Nancy Watkins, appeals her conviction, following a bench
trial in the Circuit Court (Gardner, J.), on charges of aggravated driving while
intoxicated and driving while intoxicated. See RSA 265-A:2, :3 (2014). She
argues that her conviction was contrary to the weight of the evidence. We
assume, without deciding, that this argument is preserved.

A challenge to the weight of evidence supporting a conviction addresses
whether the State carried its burden of persuasion. State v. Spinale, 156 N.H.
456, 465 (2007). It concerns the probative value of the evidence submitted at
trial, and whether “a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of
an issue or cause than the other.” Id. (quotation omitted). A verdict is
conclusively against the weight of the evidence if it is one that no reasonable
jury could return. Id. This raises primarily a factual question for the trial
court, whose decision we will uphold “unless it was made without evidence or
constituted an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” State v. Fedor, 168 N.H.
346, 352 (2015) (quotation omitted). The trial court should grant a new trial on
weight of the evidence grounds only in “exceptional cases in which the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict and where a miscarriage of justice
may have resulted.” Spinale, 156 N.H. at 466 (quotations omitted).

In this case, the defendant argues that the weight of the evidence was
contrary to a finding that she was impaired by “intoxicating liquor or any
controlled drug, prescription drug, over-the-counter drug, or any other
chemical substance, natural or synthetic.” RSA 265-A:2, I(a), :3, I. The
evidence at trial establishes that the State Trooper who arrested the defendant
observed her driving on Route 16 in Newington; her vehicle was straddling the
broken white line that separates the lanes of traffic, and forcing numerous
other vehicles off the road. Multiple motorists had reported seeing the
defendant drive in a hazardous manner from south of the Hampton tolls on
Interstate 95. The trooper described the defendant’s driving as “some of the
worst [motor vehicle] operation [he had] seen.” A six-year-old child was with
her.
 After he stopped the defendant, the trooper observed that she was
lethargic and withdrawn, that her speech was slurred and mumbled, and that
she was difficult to understand. According to the trooper, who is a certified
drug recognition expert and is trained to identify signs of drug impairment,
what he observed were signs that the defendant was impaired by a depressant
drug. The trooper also administered three field sobriety tests, during which the
defendant exhibited numerous signs of impairment, including lack of balance
and stability and failure to follow the trooper’s instructions throughout the
tests. Although the defendant reported having arthritis, and although her feet
appeared to be swollen, she told the trooper that she had no physical condition
that would affect her ability to perform the tests. Based upon his observations,
the trooper determined that the defendant was impaired.

Following her arrest, the defendant refused to undergo a blood test or a
drug influence evaluation. See RSA 265-A:10 (2014) (a motorist’s refusal to
undergo testing pursuant to RSA 265-A:4 (2014) may be considered in
subsequent criminal proceeding). The trooper observed that she was “on the
nod” and appeared unable to keep her eyes open. A bail commissioner likewise
observed that, while he was speaking with the defendant, she kept “nodding
off,” had slurred speech, seemed confused, and had difficulty following his
instructions. Based upon his experience in observing and interacting with
impaired individuals over the course of thirty years as a bail commissioner, the
bail commissioner also opined that the defendant was “obviously impaired.”

Although the defendant offered evidence that her vehicle had mechanical
problems that would cause it to veer, and that she suffered from medical
conditions that might impact her performance on field sobriety tests, the trial
court was well within its discretion to credit the testimony of the trooper and
bail commissioner. We conclude that the trial court’s determination that the
weight of the evidence supported a finding that the defendant was impaired
was supported by the evidence and was not an unsustainable exercise of
discretion. Fedor, 168 N.H. at 352.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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