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Before a defendant’s responses made during a custodial interrogation may be used against him, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the interrogation did not violate his constitutional rights under Miranda.

[¶27] The issue of double jeopardy presents a question of constitutional law subject to de novo review.

We review the plain language of the resisting arrest statute to discern the legislature’s intent.

le punishment cases come in two varieties: first, “double- description” cases, in which the issue is whether two statutes describe two separate offenses or are merely different descriptions of the same offense; and second, “unit-of-prosecution” cases, in which the issue is whether a defendant’s continuing course of conduct is fragmented into more than one violation of a single statutory provision.

In State v. Lynch, we held that the unit of prosecution for the form of simple assault criminalizing “[r]ecklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another,” RSA 631:2-a, I(b) (2016), was “each individual act of causing bodily injury to another,” Lynch, 169 N.H. 689, 708 (2017).

State v. Lynch, 169 N.H. 689, 706 (2017) (explaining that in the “so-called ‘double-description’ cases,.

[¶8] The issue of double jeopardy presents a question of constitutional law subject to de novo review.

If, after having been informed of his Miranda rights, an accused in police custody “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (footnote omitted); see State v. Lynch, 169 N.H. 689, 693 (2017).

Although we have held that, to determine whether a defendant invoked his rights during a post-Miranda custodial interrogation, “we examine his statements under the totality of the circumstances,” State v. Lynch, 169 N.H. 689, 692-93 (2017), we have not yet addressed whether we consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a defendant has effectively invoked his rights during a pre-Miranda non-custodial interrogation.

We accord the trial court considerable deference in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

In State v. Lynch, 169 N.H. 689 (2017), we held that the unit of prosecution for the form of simple assault criminalizing “[r]ecklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another,” RSA 631:2-a, I(b) (2016), was “each individual act of causing bodily injury to another,” Lynch, 169 N.H. at 708.

We accord the trial court considerable deference in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Challenges to multiple convictions based on multiplicity can be divided into two categories.

In Berghuis, the Court held that the same standards apply “for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent.” Id.; see State v. Lynch, 169 N.H. 689, 699-700 (2017) (adopting Berghuis under the State Constitution).