Paul A. DeHetre & a. v. Linda Barron

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0337, Paul A. DeHetre & a. v. Linda
Barron, the court on February 18, 2016, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The plaintiffs, Paul A. DeHetre (Paul A.), Paul F. DeHetre, and Broadway
Auto Sales (Broadway), appeal an order of the Superior Court (Delker, J.) in
favor of the defendant, Linda Barron, in their equity action to determine the
ownership of two motorcycles. They contend that the trial court erred by
finding that the defendant owned the motorcycles. We review questions of law
de novo, and we will uphold the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are
lacking in evidentiary support or erroneous as a matter of law. Gen. Linen
Servs. v. Smirnioudis, 153 N.H. 441, 443 (2006).

At the outset, we waive Supreme Court Rule 13(3) to the extent that it
requires the record to be provided in an appendix. See Sup. Ct. R. 1. Although
the plaintiffs attached their motion to reconsider the trial court’s order to their
notice of appeal, and not to their brief or appendix, they have provided it to us.

The plaintiffs argue that the parties entered into an enforceable contract,
sometime between October 2009 and September 2010, to transfer the
motorcycles to Paul A. The existence of a contract is a factual question to be
determined by the trier of fact. Durgin v. Pillsbury Lake Water Dist., 153 N.H.
818, 821 (2006). The plaintiffs rely upon three letters from the defendant’s
attorneys to Paul A. to establish the contract.

The trial court implicitly found that the letters did not establish the
existence of a contract. Although its order did not directly address whether a
contract existed, at the hearing, the trial court observed that the first letter
“pretty obviously” was not “a final agreement” between the parties. It admitted
all three of the letters into evidence because “how that discussion progressed is
relevant to whether it culminated in a formal agreement.” Ultimately, however,
the trial court determined that the defendant owned the motorcycles.
Accordingly, we assume that it found that the parties did not enter into a
contract to transfer the motorcycles to Paul A. See Nordic Inn Condo. Owners’
Assoc. v. Ventullo, 151 N.H. 571, 586 (2004) (stating we assume trial court
made all findings necessary to support its decision).
 We conclude that the evidence at trial supports the trial court’s implicit
finding. Nothing in the record establishes that Paul A. assented to or
performed the actions proposed in the three letters. On the contrary, he
admits that he refused to execute the purchase and sale agreements, which
waived any warranties, that the defendant requested in return for transferring
the motorcycles to him. In response to the attorneys’ letters, he claimed that
the defendant had already transferred the motorcycles to him in 2008, which
contradicts his claim that he entered into a contract with the defendant in
2009 or 2010 to transfer the motorcycles to him.

The plaintiffs next argue that they acquired title to the motorcycles as a
matter of law when the defendant executed the original titles in 2008 and
allegedly delivered them to Paul A. Transfer of title to a motor vehicle requires
that the owner: (1) “execute an assignment and warranty of title to the
transferee in the space provided therefor” on the title, RSA 261:14, I (2014);
and (2) deliver the title to the transferee. Id. Although Paul A. testified that the
defendant signed the titles to the motorcycles in blank and delivered them to
him, the defendant testified that she signed the titles, but never gave them to
anyone, instead keeping them in her possession. The plaintiffs argue that it
“defies logic” that the defendant executed the titles in blank without
“anticipat[ing] a transfer of the titles,” but this does not conclusively
demonstrate that she intended to transfer them to Paul A. or Broadway.

The trial court concluded that “[t]his case essentially comes down to a
credibility contest between Paul A.” and the defendant. It found that the
defendant “was more credible than Paul A.” because “[h]er explanation of the
events surrounding the purchase of the two motorcycles was more logical and
more consistent with the documentary evidence than Paul A.’s story” and “her
demeanor . . . and the consistency of her version supported her credibility.” It
also found that “Paul A.’s affect did not appear genuine, he was combative
when confronted with conflicting or inconsistent evidence, and his explanation
for his conduct simply did not ring true.” We defer to the trial court’s judgment
on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility
of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence. N.H. Fish &
Game Dep’t v. Bacon, 167 N.H. 591, 596 (2015).

The plaintiffs argue that the defendant knew that Paul A. and Broadway
“had custody and control of the original certificates of title” and that she
obtained duplicate New Hampshire titles to the motorcycles “in an effort to cut
off the chain of title to Broadway.” However, the defendant testified that she
believed that she had lost the titles and that she obtained duplicate titles in
February 2009, prior to learning, in 2010, that Paul A. had taken the originals.
We defer to the trial court’s credibility determination as to this factual dispute.
See id.

2
 The plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have looked beyond the
legal title to the motorcycles and awarded them the motorcycles because Paul
A. demonstrated more “incidents of ownership” than the defendant. However,
the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that the defendant owns the
motorcycles. See Gen. Linen, 153 N.H. at 443.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

3