Brian J. Goodman v. OneWest Bank, FSB

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0216, Brian J. Goodman v. OneWest Bank,
FSB, the court on September 25, 2015, issued the following
order:

The defendant’s motion to strike is granted as to the documents in the
plaintiff’s appendix at pages 20-23, 64-66, and 76, which the plaintiff agrees
were not part of the trial court record; the motion is otherwise denied without
prejudice as to the arguments made in the defendant’s brief.

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We vacate and remand.

The plaintiff, Brian J. Goodman, appeals orders of the Superior Court
(Smukler, J.) dismissing his claim against the defendant, OneWest Bank, FSB,
and denying his motion to amend his complaint, arguing that the trial court
unsustainably exercised its discretion in its orders.

The protracted history of this case includes numerous continuances
requested by the parties and several periods of extended settlement
negotiations. The plaintiff initiated the case in 2009 by filing an ex parte
petition to enjoin a foreclosure, alleging that he was in the process of applying
for a workout with the defendant and needed additional time to complete the
process. The trial court granted the request on an ex parte basis and
scheduled a temporary hearing. The court continued the temporary hearing
twice at the parties’ request before the plaintiff notified the court that the case
had settled. On August 5, 2010, the court dismissed the case for the parties’
failure to file settlement documents. On September 21, 2010, it vacated the
dismissal at the request of the plaintiff, who asserted that there was a
miscommunication between the parties regarding his loan modification request
and that the case should be reopened pending a final agreement. The court
scheduled a structuring conference, which it continued twice at the parties’
request before issuing a structuring conference order on June 24, 2011, and
scheduling a jury trial in July 2012. The court continued the trial three times
at the parties’ request before November 21, 2013, when the parties appeared
for trial.

Earlier that month, the defendant moved in limine to preclude the
plaintiff from asserting a claim for damages, arguing that his pleadings alleged
only an equitable claim to enjoin a foreclosure. At a hearing held on the day
scheduled for trial, the court addressed the motion, noting that while the
“pleadings [were] less than perfect,” the case “ha[d] morphed . . . into a civil
claim for damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation.” The
defendant argued that such a claim “ha[d] never been pled in the four year
history of this case.” The trial court started to respond, “If you thought that
the thing had not been adequately pled – ” before defense counsel interrupted
and asserted that empaneling the jury would be a waste of time “when this
case can be resolved between the parties.” After the court granted the parties a
brief recess, they notified the court that they had once again settled the case.
Several months later, the plaintiff advised the court that the parties were
unable to agree on the terms of the settlement. After a hearing on the
plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement, which had been continued
numerous times at the parties’ request, the court concluded on August 25,
2014, that there had been no meeting of the minds on settlement terms. The
court returned the case to the active docket for a trial “on the plaintiff’s claim
that [the defendant] breached a contract to modify the plaintiff’s note and
mortgage” and scheduled the trial for March 2015.

On January 6, 2015, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to plead
a claim, arguing that the plaintiff “failed to allege any facts that would amount
to any type of a breach, or any cause of action supported by any facts.” The
plaintiff objected, arguing that his allegations “have been stated on many court
documents previously filed.” The plaintiff referenced the trial court’s November
21, 2013 ruling that he had alleged a cause of action for breach of contract.
The plaintiff accompanied his objection with a motion to amend his complaint
to “formally plead the Breach of Contract claim which was understood to be
tried by the parties.”

Without conducting a hearing on the motions or issuing a narrative order
explaining its rationale, the trial court dismissed the case “for the reasons set
forth in the [defendant’s] motion” and denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend as
“untimely.” On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its
orders, given the record in this case, which includes the court’s ruling that
although the plaintiff’s pleadings were “less than perfect,” it was prepared to
seat a jury for a trial on the breach of contract claim.

We review the trial court’s management of the proceedings before it
under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. Leone v. Leone, 161
N.H. 566, 568 (2011). This means that we review only whether the record
establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment
made. Id. The trial court’s decision is unsustainable if it is clearly untenable
or unreasonable to the prejudice of the plaintiff’s case. Id. In this case,
without a hearing transcript or narrative order explaining why the trial court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, after rejecting the same arguments
over a year earlier, and why it denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend as
“untimely,” given its November 21, 2013 ruling, we conclude that the record

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lacks an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court’s discretionary
judgment. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s orders and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this order.

In light of our decision, we need not address the plaintiff’s remaining
arguments.

Vacated and remanded.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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