In the Matter of Keli Eckroate-Breagy and Paul Breagy

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2014-0707, In the Matter of Keli Eckroate-
Breagy and Paul Breagy, the court on July 13, 2015, issued the
following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The petitioner, Keli Eckroate-Breagy (wife), appeals the final decree of the
Circuit Court (LeFrancois, J.) in her divorce from the respondent, Paul Breagy
(husband). She argues that the trial court erred in: (1) determining the
amount and duration of alimony; (2) providing the husband with three years in
which to pay the property settlement, without requiring him to make periodic
installment payments, pay interest, or provide security for the payment;
(3) failing to order the husband to pay the cost of her health insurance;
(4) ordering each party to bear equal responsibility for the Citi Card debt; and
(5) ordering each party to bear equal responsibility for the profit or loss on the
sale of the former marital home.

The wife first argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised its
discretion in determining the amount and duration of alimony. The trial court
is afforded broad discretion in awarding alimony. In the Matter of Nassar &
Nassar, 156 N.H. 769, 772 (2008). We will not overturn its decision absent an
unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id.

A trial court may award alimony if it finds that:

(a) [t]he party in need lacks sufficient income, property, or both . . .
to provide for such party’s reasonable needs, taking into account
the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed
during the marriage; and (b) [t]he party from whom alimony is
sought is able to meet reasonable needs while meeting those of the
party seeking alimony, taking into account the style of living to
which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage;
and (c) [t]he party in need is unable to be self-supporting through
appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets
reasonable needs . . . .

RSA 458:19, I (Supp. 2014). In this case, the trial court found that the wife
lacks sufficient income, that the husband has an ability to pay, and that the
wife is unable to be self-supporting at present without alimony. The court
determined the wife’s need to be approximately $2,274 per month. In
determining the amount of alimony, the court may consider the value of
economic and non-economic contributions to the family unit, RSA 458:19, IV(d)
(Supp. 2014), and:

shall consider the length of the marriage; the age, health, social or
economic status, occupation, amount and sources of income, the
property awarded . . ., vocational skills, employability, estate,
liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; the opportunity of each
for future acquisition of capital assets and income; the fault of
either party as defined in RSA 458:16-a, II(l); and the federal tax
consequences of the order.

RSA 458:19, IV(b) (Supp. 2014).

After expressly considering these factors, the trial court awarded the wife
alimony of $2,000 per month for one year and $1,000 per month for the
following two years. The wife argues that the alimony award is insufficient to
provide for her reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the
parties had become accustomed during the marriage. She further argues that
there is no evidence that she will become fully self-supportive within three
years at a standard of living comparable to that to which the parties had
become accustomed during the marriage. By contrast, she argues, the alimony
award will allow the husband to maintain a “lifestyle” close to that which the
parties enjoyed during the marriage.

The primary purpose of alimony is rehabilitative. In the Matter of
Nassar, 156 N.H. at 777. “This principle is based upon the realization that
modern spouses are equally able to function in the job market and to provide
for their own financial needs.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Alimony should,
therefore, generally be designed to encourage the recipient to establish an
independent source of income.” Id. (quotation omitted). In this case, the trial
court stated that its alimony award was intended to be rehabilitative. The
court concluded that its award “should give [the wife] a graduated transition to
obtain a full time job at a level where she could self-support with benefits.”

The record shows that the wife has a bachelor’s degree and marketable
job skills, appears to be in good health, and has no minor children to support.
The wife testified that she works in a “career-oriented type of job” at the post
office, and that her goal is to become a postmaster. She anticipates that her
postal employment will become full-time with benefits. She testified that
already she has been assured of a promotion. In the meantime, the court
noted, the wife is working only part-time, thirty hours per week. The court
found that the wife “made some efforts but not an aggressive effort” to increase
her income through additional, part-time employment. The court also found

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that while the husband has “some ability to pay” alimony, he does not have the
ability to pay the $2,300 per month required under the temporary orders.
Based upon this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably
exercised its discretion in its alimony award. See id. at 772.

We next address the wife’s argument that the trial court erred in
providing the husband with three years in which to pay the $20,279 property
settlement, without requiring installment payments. We note that while this
appeal was pending, the wife notified this court that the husband paid the
$20,279 property settlement, and that she was withdrawing this issue from her
appeal. Accordingly, we do not address it. Separately, however, the wife
argues that the court erred in failing to award interest and security for the
$20,279 payment that the husband owed. Assuming, without deciding, that
these issues are not moot, we note that the trial court has the discretion to
determine whether to award interest for delayed payments, see In the Matter of
Nyhan and Nyhan, 147 N.H. 768, 771 (2002), and conclude that the trial court
did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by not awarding interest or
security in this case, see id.

The wife next argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised its
discretion in failing to order the husband to pay the cost of her health
insurance for three years. The court ordered the husband to maintain health,
dental, and vision coverage for the wife for three years; however, the wife is
required to pay the cost of maintaining such coverage. The wife argues that
considering her age, her lack of employer-provided health coverage, the
disparity of income between the parties, and the husband’s ability to pay, the
husband should be required to pay for her health, dental, and vision coverage.
We note that the trial court expressly considered these factors, with the
exception of health coverage, in its alimony award. “If the court’s findings can
reasonably be made on the evidence presented, they will stand.” In the Matter
of Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31, 36 (2002). Based upon this record, we
cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in
requiring the wife to pay the cost of maintaining her coverage under the
husband’s employer’s plan. See id. at 40 (affirming trial court’s decision
regarding payment for health insurance).

The wife next argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised its
discretion in ordering that each party shall be equally responsible for the debt
on the Citi Card. The division of marital debt is within the trial court’s
discretion. See In the Matter of Muller & Muller, 164 N.H. 512, 518-19 (2013).
In this case, the trial court found the approximate balance on the Citi Card to
be $10,356 as of the date of the parties’ separation and determined that it was
a marital debt for which each party is equally responsible. The court ordered
the wife’s share, $5,178, to be offset against the property division the husband
owes her for the car and retirement funds. Although the wife testified that the
husband used the Citi Card for his business expenses, we defer to the trial

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court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in testimony, measuring
the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence.
In the Matter of Aube & Aube, 158 N.H. 459, 465 (2009). Based upon this
record, we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its
discretion in ordering that each party to be equally responsible for the debt on
the Citi Card. See In the Matter of Muller, 164 N.H. at 518-19.

Finally, the wife argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised its
discretion in ordering each party to share equally the loss or profit on the sale
of the former marital home in Illinois. The parties agree that the home has a
fair market value of $280,000 and a mortgage of approximately $343,000,
which exceeds the value by approximately $63,000. Based upon this record,
we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion
in ordering each party to bear equally the loss or profit on the sale of the
former marital home. See id.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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