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We review the Council’s rulings on issues of law de novo.

We do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole.

We review the Council’s rulings on issues of law de novo.

rely on Appeal of Michele, where we observed in the context of easements that “[b]ecause the term ‘owner’ encompasses property interests other than fee ownership, the Micheles’ citation to the repeated use of the terms ‘owner,’ ‘property owner,’ and ‘landowner’ throughout the statutory scheme [of RSA chapter 482-A] does not advance their argument” that only fee owners can apply for a dock permit.

In reviewing the council’s findings, our task is not to determine whether we would have found differently or to reweigh the evidence, but, rather, to determine whether the findings are supported by competent evidence in the record.

First, citing our recent decision in Appeal of Michele, 168 N.H. 98, 102-05, 123 A.3d 255 (2015), it asserts that this court "has already determined that an easement holder is an owner for purposes of RSA 482-A."

We use the same principles of construction when interpreting both statutes and regulations.

We use the same principles of construction when interpreting both statutes and regulations.

Appeal of Michele, 168 N.H. 98, 102, 123 A.3d 255 (2015) (quotation omitted).

“We use the same 3 principles of construction when interpreting both statutes and regulations.” Appeal of Michele, 168 N.H. 98, 102 (2015) (quotation omitted).

Finally, we address whether the trial court erred by not finding that: (1) RSA 482-A:3, XIII(b) was a dock-permitting requirement that DES waived when it issued the defendants’ permit, but see Appeal of Michele, 168 N.H. 98, 104 (2015) (stating that DES’s authority to regulate docks does not divest courts of jurisdiction to decide underlying property rights); and (2) the defendants had a vested right to dock boats on the left side of their dock in its permitted location that predated the enactme

Appeal of Michele, 168 N.H. 98, 102 (2015) (explaining that we construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result).

In reviewing the Council’s findings, our task is not to determine whether we would have found differently or to reweigh the evidence, but, rather, to determine whether the findings are supported by competent evidence in the record.

We will not set aside the Council’s order except for errors of law, unless we are satisfied, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that it is unjust or unreasonable.