Appeal of Eric Dupuis

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2014-0393, Appeal of Eric Dupuis, the court
on July 14, 2015, issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs of the parties and the record submitted on
appeal, the court concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in
this case. The petitioner, Eric Dupuis, appeals a decision of the New
Hampshire Attorney General (AG) upholding the determination of the New
Hampshire Victims’ Assistance Commission (Commission), denying the
petitioner’s claim for compensation for injuries he suffered following a burglary
in his home. We affirm.

The record establishes the following facts. In February 2012, an intruder
entered the home of the petitioner and his wife while they were sleeping in their
bedroom. The petitioner’s wife woke the petitioner after hearing the shaking of
the locked handle of their bedroom door. After the petitioner grabbed a gun,
opened the bedroom door, and entered the hallway, the intruder ran past him
and out the front door of the house.

Once the intruder left the home, the petitioner entered his vehicle and
drove down a road to search for the intruder. The petitioner eventually turned
the vehicle around, and, on his way back home, he saw the intruder on the
road. After stopping and leaving his vehicle, the petitioner tackled the intruder
and restrained him until an off-duty police officer arrived. In the course of
tackling and restraining the intruder, the petitioner’s leg was injured. The
intruder was later charged with burglary. See RSA 635:1 (2007) (amended
2014).

In October 2012, the petitioner filed a claim with the Commission
seeking compensation, in part, for medical expenses and lost wages that
stemmed from his injuries. The Commission denied his claim, determining
that he was ineligible for compensation under New Hampshire Administrative
Rules, Jus 605.02(e).

The petitioner moved for reconsideration. Following a hearing, at which
both the petitioner and his wife testified, the Commission upheld its denial of
the claim. The Commission explained that, because the “crime of burglary
ended when the offender left [the petitioner’s] property,” the petitioner’s injury
resulted from the petitioner’s “pursuit of the offender and [was] not a direct
result of the crime.”
 Thereafter, the petitioner appealed to the AG. See N.H. Admin. Rules,
Jus 603.03(p). The AG agreed with the Commission that the petitioner’s
“conduct primarily contributed to his injury,” and, therefore, the AG upheld the
Commission’s decision denying the petitioner’s request for compensation. See
N.H. Admin. Rules, Jus 605.02(e). This appeal followed.

The petitioner argues that it was error to deny his request for
compensation. RSA chapter 541 governs our review. See N.H. Admin. Rules,
Jus 603.03(v); see also RSA 541:2, :6 (2007). RSA 541:13 (2007) provides:

Upon the hearing the burden of proof shall be upon the
party seeking to set aside any order or decision of the commission
to show that the same is clearly unreasonable or unlawful, and all
findings of the commission upon all questions of fact properly
before it shall be deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable;
and the order or decision appealed from shall not be set aside or
vacated except for errors of law, unless the court is satisfied, by a
clear preponderance of the evidence before it, that such order is
unjust or unreasonable.

Resolution of this appeal requires statutory and regulatory
interpretation. We use the same principles of construction when interpreting
both statutes and regulations. Appeal of Old Dutch Mustard Co., 166 N.H.
501, 506 (2014). We first look to the language of the statute or regulation
itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and
ordinary meaning. Id. When the language of the statute or regulation is clear
on its face, its meaning is not subject to modification. Id.

The petitioner argues that New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Jus
605.02(e) does not bar his claim for compensation because his injury resulted
from the burglary, and not his own conduct. The petitioner asserts that the
burglary did not end when the intruder left his home because “the threat
remained” until the intruder was apprehended.

The version of RSA 635:1 in effect at the time of the incident stated, in
relevant part, that “[a] person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or
occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied section thereof, with
purpose to commit a crime therein.” According to the statute’s plain language,
a necessary element of a burglary is that a perpetrator be within “a building or
occupied structure.” RSA 635:1, I. Thus, the burglary concluded, at the latest,
upon the intruder’s exit from the petitioner’s home because he no longer
remained in the home. See id. Indeed, when the petitioner suffered his
injuries, both he and the intruder were not in the home, but were outside along
a road. Therefore, we conclude that it was not error to find that the burglary
had been completed at the time the petitioner suffered his injuries.

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 We also disagree with the petitioner’s argument that New Hampshire
Administrative Rules, Jus 605.02(e) does not bar his claim for compensation.
This regulation provides, in pertinent part, that the Commission “shall deny
the claim for compensation in its entirety” if the “primary victim engaged in
conduct that primarily contributed to his or her personal injury or death.”
N.H. Admin. Rules, Jus 605.02(e). Although the intruder’s entrance into the
petitioner’s home triggered the series of events that eventually concluded with
the petitioner suffering injuries, we agree with the determination that the
petitioner’s own conduct primarily contributed to his injuries. See id.; see also
Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1537 (2d ed. 2001) (defining
“primarily,” in this context, as “essentially; mostly; chiefly; principally”). But
for the petitioner’s decision to leave his home after the burglary ended, enter
his vehicle, pursue the intruder down the road in his vehicle, tackle the
intruder, and then physically restrain the intruder until assistance arrived, the
petitioner’s injuries would not have occurred. Accordingly, pursuant to the
plain language of New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Jus 605.02(e), the
petitioner was not eligible for compensation from the Commission. For these
reasons, we conclude that the finding that the petitioner is not entitled to
compensation was not clearly unreasonable or unlawful.

To the extent that the petitioner asserts that he effectuated a proper
citizen’s arrest and that his use of force against the intruder was justified
based upon various provisions of the Criminal Code, his arguments are not
material to the issue before us; here, we are required to apply the regulations
governing compensation to victims of crime to the facts of this case.

Moreover, the petitioner argues that general public policy considerations
justified his actions and entitle him to compensation. We are not
unsympathetic to the petitioner’s position, given his injuries and financial
losses; but our review is necessarily limited to the unambiguous provisions of
the regulations at issue here and the petitioner has not demonstrated that the
decision to deny him compensation contravened public policy as expressed in
the regulations. See Appeal of Merrimack County, 156 N.H. 35, 45 (2007).
Finally, any issues raised in the notice of appeal, but not fully briefed, are
deemed waived. See In re Estate of King, 149 N.H. 226, 230 (2003).

Affirmed.

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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