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“Fraud on the court” has been described as “only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases.” Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 651 (2015) (emphasis and quotation omitted).

Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 651-52 (2015); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Hosp., 115 N.H. 709, 711 (1975).

Etienne, 163 N.H. at 96; Barton v. Plaisted, 109 N.H. 428, 432-33 (1969); see also Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 652 (2015) (observing that under RSA 526:1, perjury by a witness may constitute grounds for a new trial).

In reviewing the trial court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in its capacity as the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment.

In the summary judgment context, we have explained that we apply our traditional summary judgment standard of review to the legal issues and to the determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, but we review the trial court’s decision to grant equitable relief for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, we “consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in its capacity as the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 648 (2015) (quotation omitted).

“Fraud on the court” is a type of fraud by an officer of the court that seeks to obstruct proper case adjudication.

He further argued that the motion for a new trial was timely, notwithstanding the relevant three-year limitations period, see RSA 526:4 (2007), because the defendant’s counsel had allegedly committed “fraud on the court” for purposes of Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 652 (2015) in procuring the dismissal without prejudice in 2007.

for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 648-49 (2015).

We review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.

We have recognized that “fraud will vitiate a judgment, and a court of equity may declare it a nullity.” Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 651 (2015) (brackets and quotation omitted).

“Although we apply our traditional summary judgment standard of review to the legal issues and to the determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we review the trial court’s decision to grant equitable relief” — in the form of tolling the statute of limitations — “for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 648- 49 (2015).

Conant v. O'Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 648, 117 A.3d 692 (2015) (quotation omitted).

s. II In reviewing a trial court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment, we “consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in its capacity as the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 648 (2015) (quotation omitted).

of Review In reviewing a trial court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment, “[w]e consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party 2 in its capacity as the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 648 (2015) (quotation omitted).

We review the trial court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment under the following standard: “[W]e consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in its capacity as the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 648 (2015) (quotation omitted).

Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 648 (2015) (quotations, citations, and brackets omitted).

We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant equitable relief for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 649 (2015); see Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 24 (2007) (“We will uphold a trial court’s equitable order unless it constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion.”).