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Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 642-43 (2014) (observing that, generally, standing “requires parties to have personal legal or equitable rights that are adverse to one another, with regard to an actual, not hypothetical, dispute, which is capable of judicial redress” (citations omitted)).

Discussion The doctrine of standing “limits the judicial role, consistent with a system of separated powers, to addressing those matters that are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 643 (2014) (quotation omitted); see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014).

The simplest and most obvious interpretation of a constitution, if in itself sensible, is most likely to be that meant by the people in its adoption.” Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted).

ACG Credit Co. v. Gill, 152 N.H. 260, 264 (2005) (as a general rule, parties do not have standing to assert the rights of another); Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640 (2014) (issues of standing may be raised sua sponte).

remain ripe” because they incurred damages as a result of the cease and desist order and are entitled to enhanced compensatory damages and attorney’s fees and costs based upon OFM’s “oppressive conduct.” To bring a declaratory judgment claim under RSA 491:22 (Supp. 2018), a party must show that some right of the party has been impaired or prejudiced by the application of a rule or statute.

Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 642-43, 102 A.3d 913 (2014) (citations omitted).

“[S]tanding under the New Hampshire Constitution requires parties to have personal legal or equitable rights that are adverse to one another, with regard to an actual, not hypothetical, dispute, which is capable of judicial redress.” Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 642-43 (2014) (citations omitted).

However, consistent with our longstanding practice, we will not construe a legislative enactment as unconstitutional when it is susceptible to a construction rendering it constitutional.

Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640, 102 A.3d 913 (2014) (explaining that "standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction").

Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640 (2014) (explaining that “standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction”).

The respondent argues that standing requires parties to have personal legal or equitable rights that are adverse to one another, with regard to an actual, not hypothetical, dispute, which is capable of judicial redress, Duncan v. State of N.H., 166 N.H. 630, 642-43 (2014), and that a party must demonstrate harm to maintain a legal challenge, Birch Broad.

DOIT correctly notes that standing, like the filing deadline of RSA 541:6, is a jurisdictional prerequisite.

Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640 (2014) (explaining that “standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction”).

DOIT correctly notes that standing, like the filing deadline of RSA 541:6, is a jurisdictional prerequisite.

titution in New Hampshire We respectfully request to be excused from answering both questions Part ll, Article 74 of the State Constitution “empowers the justices of the supreme court to render advisory opinions, outside the context of concrete fully-developed factual situations and without the benefit of adversary legal presentations only in carefully circumscribed situations.” Duncan v. State 166 N.H. 630, 640 (2014) (quotation omitted).

Because there is not presently any adversity between any parties in interest, and because we are not authorized to issue advisory opinions at the behest of anyone other than the legislature or the Governor and Council, the plaintiffs suggest that we may not have subject matter jurisdiction to answer the questions tendered to us by the trial court.

legal or equitable right or title may maintain a petition against any person claiming adversely to such right or title to determine the question as between the parties, and the court’s judgment or decree thereon shall be conclusive.” To establish standing to bring a declaratory judgment proceeding under RSA 491:22, I, a party must show that some right of the party has been impaired or prejudiced.

“[S]tanding under the New Hampshire Constitution requires parties to have personal legal or equitable rights that are adverse to one another, with regard to an actual, not hypothetical, dispute, which is capable of judicial redress.” Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 642-43 (2014) (citations omitted).

Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640-48 (2014) (discussing standing requirements).

Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 641 (2014) (“Except as provided in Part II, Article 74 [of the New Hampshire Constitution], the judicial power in this State is limited to deciding actual, and not hypothetical, cases.”).

at 196; see also Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 641-43 (2014) (discussing constitutional significance of the doctrine of standing).

Because this argument was first raised on appeal, we note that standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640 (2014), and that “[a] challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the proceeding, including on appeal.” Close v. Fisette, 146 N.H. 480, 483 (2001).

“[B]ecause standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, we may raise the issue of a party’s standing sua sponte.” Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640 (2014).

Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 641 (2014) (noting that we decide actual, not hypothetical cases); see also In re Guardianship of R.A., 155 N.H. 98, 100-101 (2007) (discussing mootness doctrine).

Part II, Article 74 of the State Constitution “empowers the justices of the supreme court to render advisory opinions, outside the context of concrete, fully-developed factual situations and without the benefit of adversary legal presentations, only in carefully circumscribed situations.” Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 640 (2014) (quotation omitted).