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“Our standard of review is whether the board acted illegally with respect to jurisdiction, authority or observance of the law, whereby it arrived at a conclusion which cannot legally or reasonably be made, or abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 728 (2014) (quotation omitted).

“Because RSA chapter 100-A does not provide for judicial review, a writ of certiorari is the sole remedy available to a party aggrieved by a decision of the NHRS.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 728 (2014) (quotation omitted).

Because RSA chapter 100-A does not provide for judicial review, see RSA ch. 100-A (2013 & Supp. 2021), a writ of certiorari is the sole remedy available to a party aggrieved by a decision of the NHRS.

Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014) (explaining that we interpret statutes as written).

Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014) (“We.

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014).

Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014) (when interpreting a statute we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include).

Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729, 103 A.3d 793 (2014) (when interpreting a statute we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include).

“Because RSA chapter 100-A does not provide for judicial review, a writ of certiorari is the sole remedy available to a party aggrieved by a decision of the NHRS.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 728 (2014) (quotation omitted).

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014).

ers settled on “religious organization.” According to the petitioner, the drafters intended for this 4 broader term to “match the IRS’s interpretation of church under [federal tax law], which include[d] synagogues, mosques and other places of worship.” Statutory interpretation is a question of law, “which we review de novo.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014).

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014).

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014).

We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo.

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014).

Additionally, “[w]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute itself for further indications of legislative intent.” Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014).

When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute itself for further indications of legislative intent.