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A trial court may permit a substantive amendment to pleadings at any stage of the proceedings, upon such terms as the court shall deem just and reasonable, when it shall appear to the court that it is necessary for the prevention of injustice.

II Under New Hampshire law, liberal amendment of pleadings is permitted unless the changes would surprise the opposing party, introduce an entirely new cause of action, call for substantially different evidence, or fail to correct the defect in the original complaint.

Sanguedolce v. Wolfe, 164 N.H. 644, 648 (2013) (“An amendment may.

Accordingly, liberal amendment of pleadings is permitted unless the amendment would surprise the opposing party, introduce an entirely new cause of action, or call for substantially different evidence.

Accordingly, liberal amendment of pleadings is permitted unless the changes would surprise the opposing party, introduce an entirely new cause of action, or call for substantially different evidence.

Fudge v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1018-19 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Sanguedolce v. Wolfe, 164 N.H. 644, 647 (2013) (concluding as a matter of law that false statements concerning the plaintiff “cannot be reasonably construed as defamatory”).

However, we do not assume the truth of statements that are merely conclusions of law.

However, we do not assume the truth of statements in the plaintiff’s pleadings that are merely conclusions of law.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, our standard of review is whether the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.

3 II In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, our standard of review is whether the allegations in the plaintiffs’ pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, our standard of review is whether the allegations in the plaintiffs’ pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.

6 III Turning next to the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s good faith and fair dealing claim, “our standard of review is whether the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” Sanguedolce v. Wolfe, 164 N.H. 644, 645 (2013).

“[W]e decline to address, [however,] in the first instance, whether the [plaintiffs’] allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery,” Sanguedolce v. Wolfe, 164 N.H. 644, 648 (2013) (quotation omitted), or, in other words, whether the claim would survive a motion to dismiss brought upon a ground other than failure to identify the provision alleged to have been violated.

Standard of Review In reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we consider “whether the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” Sanguedolce v. Wolfe, 164 N.H. 644, 645 (2013).

We are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the expert’s testimony on this point was unnecessary because it is “well-known” that contempt for cooperating witnesses is “part of prison culture[.]” We have noted, in another context, that prisoners may “look unkindly upon those who willingly cooperate with the authorities.” Sanguedolce v. Wolfe, 164 N.H. 644, 647 (2013).

v. Franchi, 163 N.H. 797, 803 (2012), and allowing a party to amend his or her pleadings so as to assert a new claim, Sanguedolce v. Wolfe, 164 N.H. 644, 648 (2013).