Cited by

Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012).

Marist Bros., 171 N.H. at 310; see also Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 653 (2012) (“We accord statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and we will not add words the legislature did not see fit to include.”).

Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012).

Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 647 (2012) (explaining that an agency’s 2 ruling will be overturned if there is no evidence in the record to support it).

We recognize, as the Department argues, that “it is well established in our case law that an interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to deference.” Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012); see N.H. Resident Ltd. Partners of Lyme Timber Co. v. N.H. Dep’t of Revenue Admin., 162 N.H. 98, 101 (2011) (stating that an administrative regulation adopted by an agency pursuant to a statute is “prima facie evidence of the proper interpretation of t

Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644, 44 A.3d 518 (2012) (explaining that while an interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to some deference, we are still the final arbiter of the legislature's intent and are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute); Appeal of Bretton Woods Tel.

Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012).

v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 810 (R.I. 2000); see also Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 655 (2012) (observing that the subsequent application doctrine is a “similar doctrine” to administrative finality).

Appeal of *736 Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 646 (2012) (“[W]e are reluctant to substitute our judgment for the expertise of administrative officials”).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are “the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012).

Concerning statutes, “[w]e are still the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012).

N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 109 (1985) (“[T]he long- standing practical and plausible interpretation [of a statute] applied by the agency responsible for its implementation, without any interference by the legislature, is evidence that the administrative construction conforms to the legislative intent.” (quotation omitted)); see also Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012).

However, “it is well established in our case law that an interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to deference.” Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012).

RSA 100-A:1, X. Although we are not bound by the board’s statutory interpretation, “it is well established in our case law that an interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to deference.” Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012).

is not absolute.” Appeal of Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 644 (2012).