Cited by

Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 399 (2012) (“SYSC is a secure facility that provides detention, treatment and rehabilitation services for serious, chronic and/or violent juvenile offenders.” (parentheses omitted)).

see Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 407-08 (2012) (observing that public employment alone does not rise to the level of a protected property right and concluding that appellant had not shown he had a protected property interest in continued public employment because he failed to cite a provision of the CBA creating such an interest).

RSA 21-I:58, I, is part of a statutory and regulatory scheme that provides “a mechanism for review of the appointing authority’s exercise of discretion.” Appeal of N.H. Div. of State Police, 171 N.H. at 270; see Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 409 (2012) (holding that the expansive language in the last sentence of RSA 21-I:58, I, “was intended to be confined to cases arising under that section — that is, appeals by permanent employees”).

RSA 541:3 (2021); Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 404-06 (2012); Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayers Rights, 133 N.H. 480, 484 (1990).

reputation — an interest at least as significant as the public employment interest at issue in Johnson, if not more significant.5 See State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 638-39 (2009) (finding “ample support in our jurisprudence for the proposition that reputational stigma can, by itself, constitute a deprivation of liberty deserving due process” under the State Constitution); cf. Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 407 (2012) (“[W]e have repeatedly reaffirmed that, as a matter of State law, public emp

Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 406 (2012) (stating that issue raised for first time in motion for rehearing not preserved for appellate review).

However, we review the PAB's interpretations of statutes and administrative rules de novo.

However, we review the PAB’s interpretations of statutes and administrative rules de novo.

Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 401 (2012); see also RSA 541:13.

RSA chapter 541 (2007) governs our review of the board’s decisions.

RSA chapter 541 (2007) governs our review of the board's decisions.

RSA 21-I:58, II (2012); Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 400 (2012).

“A party may not assert equitable estoppel to avoid the application of a statute.” Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 409 (2012) *480 (quotation and brackets omitted); cf. Petition of Perkins, 147 N.H. 652, 655-56 (2002) (finding that petitioner’s estoppel claim faded because her reliance upon representations contrary to the statute was unreasonable).

“The general rule is that a contemporaneous and specific objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review.” Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 406 (2012) (quotation omitted).

“Its interpretations of statutes and administrative rules, however, are reviewed de novo!’ Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 401 (2012).

Although O’Meara’s testimony conflicted with that of the Conants, “[a]s a fact-finding tribunal, the [PCC] was at liberty to resolve any conflict in the evidence and to accept or reject such portions of the testimony as it saw fit.” Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 403-04 (2012) (quotation omitted) (referring to personnel appeals board); see Budnitz’ Case, 139 N.H. 489, 491 (1995).

“[W]hen interpreting statutes, we do not merely look at isolated words or phrases, but instead we consider the statute as a whole.” Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 409 (2012) (quotation omitted).

First, a “party may not assert equitable estoppel to avoid the application of a statute.” Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397 (2012) (quotation omitted).