Cited by

RSA 541:3,:4 (2021); Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 665 (2011) (holding petitioners failed to preserve argument in appeal pursuant to RSA chapter 541 by failing to raise the issue in their motion for reconsideration).

7 necessary for the proper execution of the law, an agency’s authority “is designed only to permit the [agency] to fill in the details to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 662 (2011) (quotation omitted).

In Appeal of Wilson, we rejected a nearly identical challenge to Rule 203.02(d).

An administrative regulation exceeds an agency’s authority when it contradicts the terms of the governing statute.

Appeal of Cole, 171 N.H. 403, 412 (2018); Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 661 (2011).

While the legislature may delegate to administrative agencies the power to promulgate rules necessary for the proper execution of the laws, this authority “is designed only to permit the [agency] to fill in the details to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 662 (2011) (quotation omitted).

When construing a statute, “[w]e are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 662 (2011).

In matters of statutory interpretation, “[w]e are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 662 (2011).

In matters of statutory interpretation, “[w]e are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 662 (2011).

We will not construe a statute in a way that would render it “a virtual nullity.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 664 (2011).

In matters of statutory interpretation, “[w]e are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 662 (2011).

In reviewing the BTLA’s findings, our task is not to determine whether we would have found differently or to reweigh the evidence, but rather, to determine whether the findings are supported by competent evidence in the record.

RSA 541:13; see Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 661 (2011).

“Our standard for review of BTLA decisions is statutory.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 661 (2011); see RSA 541:13 (2007).

See, e.g., Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 664 (2011) (we will not interpret a statute so as to render it meaningless).

The litigation was stayed pending this court’s resolution of Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659 (2011).

We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

While we recognize that the PELRB may adopt rules and practices that “fill in the details to effectuate the purpose of the statute,” these rules and practices “may not add to, detract from, or modify the statute which they are intended to implement.” Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 662 (2011) (quotations omitted).

Nevertheless, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation.