Cited by
Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. McDonald, 35 A.3d 605.
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State v. Warren
2025 N.H. 21
N.H. 2025
State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 126 (2011); State v. West, 167 N.H. 465, 468 (2015).
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State of New Hampshire v. Richard Racette
N.H. 2022
701; see also State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 121 (2011).
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State of New Hampshire v. Richard Soulia
N.H. 2021
Moreover, it is always “the province and obligation of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses.” State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 121 (2011).
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State of New Hampshire v. Adam Wells
89 A.3d 156
N.H. 2014
“An error is harmless only if it is determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict was not affected by the error.” State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 123 (2011).
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State of New Hampshire v. William Ramsey
166 N.H. 45
N.H. 2014
The admissibility of evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
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State v. Fischer
82 A.3d 891
N.H. 2013
The admissibility of evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
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State v. Noucas
70 A.3d 476
N.H. 2013
In determining whether a ruling is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we consider whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary decision made.
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State v. Furgal
58 A.3d 648
N.H. 2012
Rather, the purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 126 (2011) (citation and quotations omitted).
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State v. Saunders
55 A.3d 1014
N.H. 2012
This, the defendant argues, impermissibly lowered the State’s burden of proof to something less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” “[T]he purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 126 (2011) (quotation omitted).
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In re D.B.
53 A.3d 646
N.H. 2012
State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 127-28 (2011) (declining to construe the term “forcible sex offense” to mean any aggravated felonious sexual assault because to do so would render the term meaningless and require the court to insert language the legislature did not see fit to include).
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New Hampshire Department of Transportation v. Franchi
48 A.3d 849
N.H. 2012
Moreover, the trial court is not required to use the specific language requested by *803 either party, see State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 126 (2011), and the court’s decision not to give the instruction requested by the landowner was not error.
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Brown v. Concord Group Insurance
44 A.3d 586
N.H. 2012
State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 127 (2011) (“The legislature could have permitted the use of deadly force against any ‘aggravated felonious sexual assault’ by using that term in the self-defense statute.
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State v. McGurk
44 A.3d 568
N.H. 2012
*587 We interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme, not in isolation.