Cited by

In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 337 (2010) (“It is the duty of the court to enter such support orders as it believes to be in the best interests of the children, and it is a responsibility that cannot be delegated or abrogated by agreement of the parties.” (quotation and brackets omitted)).

In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 336 (2010).

In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 335 (2010).

In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 335 (2010).

In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 335 (2010).

The statutory framework vests the trial court “with the ultimate responsibility for determining and safeguarding the best interests of children.” In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 337 (2010); see RSA 458-C:1 (2004).

In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 335 (2010).

“Parties may not modify orders of the court through private agreement.” In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 336 (2010).

In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 335 (2010).

In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 335 (2010).

In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 335 (2010).

He further contends that even though this agreement was not approved by the court, it is not rendered unenforceable by our decision in In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333 (2010).

Instead, it concluded that even if there had been such an agreement, it would not be enforceable because, pursuant to In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333 (2010), parties may not modify child support orders through private agreement.