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We have previously recognized that “certain property 4 surrounding a home, often described as curtilage, deserves the same protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as the home itself.” State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 264 (2010).

We have held that “when there is an access route on the property, such as a driveway or a sidewalk, members of the public have an ‘implied invitation’ to use it” and, therefore, “a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in access routes.” State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 266 (2010).

State v. Schulz, 164 6 N.H. 217, 225 (2012) (“[T]he reasonableness of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant is a distinct constitutional inquiry from the question of whether a warrant is required in the first place.”); see also, e.g., State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 267 (2010) (reasoning that “[b]ecause the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his deck, a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement was needed for the officer to lawfully enter the defendant’s deck”).

See, e.g., Smith, 169 N.H. at ___, 154 A.3d at 667 (holding that defendant tenant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallway of a rooming house, and, therefore, warrantless entry of police into that hallway did not violate the state constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures); State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 267 (2010) (concluding that police warrantless entry onto the defendant’s deck violated the State Constitution because the defendant had a reaso

State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 3 269 (2010) (reviewing court excises illegally obtained information to determine whether remaining information establishes probable cause).

“A warrant based in part upon illegally seized evidence is nonetheless valid so long as there was enough other evidence to establish probable cause.” State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 269 (2010).

If an arrest is unlawful, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and the exclusionary rule require the suppression of any evidence or statements “derivatively obtained through a violation of Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution.” State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 268 (2010); see State v. De La Cruz, 158 N.H. 564, 566 (2009).

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004); State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 269 (2010).

Probable cause exists if a person of ordinary caution would justifiably believe that what is sought will be found through the search and will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.

Because we reverse under the State Constitution, we need not reach the federal issue.

In deciding whether the defendant’s expectation of privacy is reasonable, several factors guide our inquiry: the nature of the intrusion, whether the police had a lawful right to be where they were, and the character of the location searched.

While we frequently conduct a probable cause analysis without the issue first being decided in the trial court, see, e.g., State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260 (2010), we believe that the trial court is best positioned to make the determination in this case.

State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 266 (2010) (quotation omitted).