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We observe that “[w]e must give effect to all words in a statute, and presume that the legislature did not enact superfluous or redundant words.” State v. Thiel, 160 N.H. 462, 465 (2010) (quotation omitted).

The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo.

In light of the State’s failure to provide us with this recording on appeal, we must assume that the recording supports the trial court’s determination as to this statement’s effectiveness.

Paragraph 1 of the agreement reads as follows: “New Hampshire Speedway covenants that it shall not permit any musical concerts of any type or description to be held on the premises currently known as New Hampshire International Speedway (‘premises’) except in conjunction with racing events.” 2 Relying on State v. Thiel, 160 N.H. 462 (2010), the plaintiffs assert that the term “premises” refers to “the property which a reasonable observer would perceive to be part of NH Motor Speedway,” including

When the question before us is one of statutory construction, our review is de novo.

We interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation.

While we need not here define the precise parameters of “dismissal” as used in RSA 105:2-a, we conclude that a definition encompassing the Town’s nonrenewal of the petitioner’s expiring term contract “is not consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the word.” State v. Thiel, 160 N.H. 462, 466 (2010).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.

State v. Thiel, 160 N.H. 462, 466 (2010) (looking to plain and *762 ordinary meaning of word “premises” as “the place of business of an enterprise or institution” in addressing defendant’s argument that her conduct did not meet requirements of shoplifting statute (quotation omitted)); Gen.

“In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Thiel, 160 N.H. 462, 465 (2010) (quotation omitted).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.

We are the final arbiters of the legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

It is the burden of the appealing party to provide this court with a record sufficient to decide the issues raised on appeal and to demonstrate that the appellant raised those issues before the trial court.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.