Cited by

[¶31] Finally, we have also observed that “knowing how a public body is spending taxpayer money in conducting public business is essential to the transparency of government, the very purpose underlying the Right-to-Know Law.” Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 709 (2010).

In the past, when we were confronted with an entity that was not easily characterized as either “solely private or entirely public,” we examined the structure and function of the entity to assess the entity’s relationship to government and determine whether “[the] entity is conducting the public’s business.” Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 703-06 (2010) (Professional Firefighters II) (quotation omitted) (applying government function test); see also RSA 91-A:1-a, V

Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local G’vt Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 707.

The intervenors argued that the requested records should be disclosed because the public interest in disclosure outweighs any privacy interest in nondisclosure, and the Stipulated Award “has no impact on the Right-to-Know Law analysis.” See Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 707 (2010) (explaining the balancing test used to determine whether disclosure of public records constitutes an invasion of privacy under RSA 91-A:5, IV); see also RSA 91-A:5, IV.

at 353-57 (concerning “internal personnel practices”); Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 707 (2010) (concerning “confidential, commercial, or financial information”); Reid, 169 N.H. at 528 (concerning “personnel.

Moreover, both Clay and Reid involved requests for information made pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law — the purpose of which is to ensure “the transparency of government.” Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 709 (2010).

Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 707 (2010) (setting forth a three-step analysis to determine whether disclosure will result in an invasion of privacy).1 The DOJ argues that the EES pertains to an “internal personnel practice” under Fenniman.

Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 703 (2010).

Laws 1986, 83:6; see also Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 707 (2010); Goode v. N.H. Legislative Budget Assistant, 148 N.H. 551, 555-56 (2002); Union Leader Corp. v. N.H. Housing Fin.

Montenegro, 162 N.H. at 649-50 (narrowly interpreting the “internal personnel practices” exemption to not include job titles); Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 707-10 (2010) (narrowly interpreting the exemption for “confidential, commercial, or financial information” the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of privacy); Lambert, 157 N.H. at 379-86 (narrowly interpreting various exemptions); N.H. Civil Liberties Union v. City of Manchester, 149 N.H. 437,

Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 703 (2010).

“Our ultimate goal in construing the Right-to-Know Law is to further the statutory and constitutional objectives of increasing public access to all public documents and governmental proceedings and to provide the utmost information to the public about what its government is up to.” Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 705 (2010) (quotation and citation omitted); see also N.H. CONST. pt.

“If no privacy interest is at stake, then the Right-to-Know Law mandates disclosure.” Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 707 (2010).

Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 703 (2010).

Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 701 (2010).

We followed Mans in Professional Firefighters of New Hampshire v. Local Government Center, 159 N.H. 699 (2010), where we affirmed an order requiring the Local Government Center to disclose the “names and individual salary information” of its employees.

which is a question of law that we review de novo.” Prof l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 703 (2010).

When statutory language is ambiguous, however, we will consider legislative history, see Profl Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov’t Ctr., 159 N.H. 699, 703 (2010), and examine the statute’s overall objective and presume that the legislature would not pass an act that would lead to an absurd or illogical result.