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7 [¶26] “While a single transaction can give rise to multiple, distinct offenses, crimes will merge only where the identical criminal act constitutes both offenses.” State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 341 (2009).

Even though the defendant testified that she was sober at the time of arrest, it was well within the discretion of the trial judge not to believe the defendant’s testimony.

“To prove attempted murder, the State is required to submit sufficient evidence that a person took a substantial step toward killing another with the purpose of accomplishing the killing.” State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 338 (2009); see also RSA 626:2, II(a) (2011) (defining “purposely”); RSA 629:1, I (defining “attempt”).

In engaging in this analysis, we examine each item of evidence within the context of all the evidence, and not in isolation, State v. Sanborn, 168 N.H. 400, 413 (2015), mindful that “common sense evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is within the province and obligation of the jury,” State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 339 (2009) (quotation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted); see also State v. Spinale, 156 N.H. 456, 463 (2007) (in deciding challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to convict, the t

In engaging in this analysis, we examine each item of evidence within the context of all the evidence, and not in isolation, State v. Sanborn, 168 N.H. 400, 413 (2015), mindful that “common sense evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is within the province and obligation of the” trier of fact, State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 339 (2009) (quotation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted); see also State v. Spinale, 156 N.H. 456, 463 (2007) (in deciding challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to convi

To convict the defendant as an accomplice, the State was required to prove that he: (1) had the purpose to make the crime succeed; (2) solicited, aided, or attempted to aid Stone in committing the offense; and (3) shared the requisite state of mind for the offense.

State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 339 (2009) (quotation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).

these posts on Facebook.” Although the defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in its interpretation of RSA 644:4, II, he makes only a passing reference in his brief to the issue; therefore, he has failed to develop this argument sufficiently for our review.

5 We further note that, although the defendant alleges that the untimely warrant return violates his “due process rights,” he has failed to develop this argument sufficiently for our review.

To establish that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion, the defendant must show that the decision was clearly unreasonable or untenable to the prejudice of his case.

In so arguing, he relies primarily upon our decision in State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332 (2009).

The defendant contends that “[cjourts addressing the distinction between intent to kill and intent to seriously injure, based on the same conduct toward the same victim, have discerned no meaningful difference.” See, e.g., State v. Murray, 757 A.2d 578, 584 (Conn. 2000); State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 343 (2009); State v. Ramsey, 1 A.3d 796, 804 (N.J.

State v. Winward, 161 N.H. 533, 539 (2011); see also State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 340 (2009) (where defendant charged as both principal and accomplice, “evidence supporting each element of accomplice liability also would be sufficient to support the conviction[] against the defendant”).

To prevail on this claim, the defendant must establish that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 338 (2009) (quotation omitted).

State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 338 (2009) (quotation omitted).

State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332, 340 (2009) (“evidence supporting each element of accomplice liability also [was] sufficient to support the conviction[] against the defendant”).