Cited by

State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009) (“The curative admissibility doctrine applies when inadmissible prejudicial evidence has been erroneously admitted, and the opponent seeks to introduce testimony to counter the prejudice.” (quotation omitted)); cf. DePaula, 170 N.H. at 149 (discussing the strong interest, under the specific contradiction d

Barr, 172 N.H. at 693-94 (explaining that both subsidiary doctrines facilitate the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence); State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 591 (2009) (“[T]o the extent that the defendant argues that the opening-the-door doctrine does not allow the admission of hearsay evidence, he is mistaken.

State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 586, 590 (2009) (concluding that evidence of prior uncharged assaults in sexual assault prosecution was admissible after the defendant created a misleading advantage by testifying that he could “never” sexually assault his child); State v. Lopez, 156 N.H. 416, 422-23 (2007) (concluding that trial court sustainably ex

See, e.g., DePaula, 170 N.H. at 146; State v. Mazzaglia, 169 N.H. 489, 495 (2016); State v. Gaudet, 166 N.H. 390, 396 (2014); Nightingale, 160 N.H. at 579; State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009); State v. White, 155 N.H. 119, 124 (2007); see also State v. Morrill, 154 N.H. 547, 549-50 (2006) (drawing the distinction between the two but applying neither).

Compare Ayotte, 146 N.H. at 546 -48, 776 A.2d 715, and Pelkey, 145 N.H. at 135, 756 A.2d 598, with State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 590, 972 A.2d 1071 (2009), and State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 99-100, 649 A.2d 375 (1994).

(concluding that, because victim was “the only person other than the defendant in the room when the assault occurred,” her testimony regarding the assault was “instrumental to the State’s case” and impeachment was not used merely to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence); see also State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 596-97 (2009) (permitting impeachment of two witnesses because their testimony also contained evidence that was relevant and instrumental to State’s case).

Finally, the plaintiff argues that, even if evidence of the defendant’s pre-May 2014 conduct was not admissible, she was entitled to introduce such evidence pursuant to the “specific contradiction,” doctrine, see e.g., State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009), in order to counter a misleading advantage gained by the defendant in testifying that he had never “done anything bad” to the plaintiff.

Moreover, “[t]he practice in New Hampshire has been that jury voir dire is conducted solely by the trial judge, except in capital and first-degree murder cases.” State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 592 (2009).

The “opening the door” doctrine comprises two doctrines governing the admissibility of evidence.

Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary, when a claim of error is based upon both a statutory provision and a constitutional provision, we first will address the statutory argument.

Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary, we first address his statutory claims.

State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009) (doctrine of specific contradiction allows introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence to counter misleading impression created by admissible evidence introduced by opponent); State v. Carlson, 146 N.H. 52, 56 (2001) (same).

“We review challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard and reverse only if the rulings are clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of a party’s case.” State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 586 (2009).

“[T]he manner in which voir dire is conducted is wholly within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 594 (2009) (quotation omitted).

Under the “specific contradiction” branch of the opening-the-door doctrine, the State would have been entitled “to introduce previously suppressed or otherwise inadmissible evidence to counter the misleading advantage” created by the defendant.

Because the defendant argues that the State introduced admissible evidence that created a misleading impression, we are concerned with the application of the specific contradiction branch of the opening-the-door doctrine.

While the trial court applied Rule 404(b), instead of Rule 403, we uphold its determination nonetheless because “where the trial court reaches the *576 correct result on mistaken grounds, we will affirm if valid alternative grounds support the decision.” State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 591-92 (2009) (quotation omitted).

“[T]he manner in which voir dire is conducted is wholly within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 594 (2009) (quotation omitted).

“Where the trial court reaches the correct result on mistaken grounds, we will affirm if valid alternative grounds support the decision.” State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 591-92 (2009) (quotation omitted).

The defendant confuses the “specific contradiction” branch of the opening the door doctrine, see State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009), with Rule 608(b).

The “specific contradiction” doctrine is “applied when one party has introduced admissible evidence that creates a misleading advantage and the opponent is then allowed to introduce previously suppressed or otherwise inadmissible evidence to counter the misleading advantage.” State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009).

In keeping with our practice of deciding constitutional issues only when necessary, see State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 592 (2009), we will address only the defendant’s implied statutory claim because it provides him the relief he seeks.