Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Duran, 960 A.2d 697.

22 citing documents.

  • State v. Allore 2025 N.H. 33 N.H. 2025
    State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 155 (2008) (“[A]n interpretation that renders statutory language superfluous and irrelevant is not a proper interpretation.”).
  • In the Matter of Molly Blaisdell and Robert Blaisdell N.H. 2021
    State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 157 (2008) (“Under the second.
  • Union Leader Corporation & a. v. Town of Salem N.H. 2020
    For the second factor “we inquire into ‘the cost of a rule’s repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied reasonably on the rule’s continued application.’” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 157 (2008) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
  • Seacoast Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth N.H. 2020
    Stare decisis, “the idea that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions,” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015), commands great respect in a society governed by the rule of law, and we do not lightly overrule a prior opinion, State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 153 (2008).
  • State of New Hampshire v. Paulson Papillon N.H. 2020
    State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 151 (2008); see State v. Anthony, 151 N.H. 492, 493-95 (2004).
  • Clark v. N.H. Dep't of Emp't Sec. 201 A.3d 652 N.H. 2019
    Because we must interpret the statute as a whole and presume that the legislature does not use superfluous language, State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 155, 960 A.2d 697 (2008), we conclude that the speech, disclosure, and full criticism of non-confidential and non-privileged content must be discussed "publicly" to receive protection under the statute.
  • Michelle Clark v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security & a. N.H. 2019
    Because we must interpret the statute as a whole and presume that the legislature does not use superfluous language, State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 155 (2008), we conclude that the speech, disclosure, and full criticism of non-confidential and non- privileged content must be discussed “publicly” to receive protection under the statute.
  • State v. Luis Lopez N.H. 2018
    o “any jail or any other place” is entitled to “credit against both the maximum and minimum terms of his sentence equal to the number of days during which the prisoner was confined in jail awaiting and during trial prior to the imposition of sentence and not under any sentence of confinement.” The statute applies to time confined in another jurisdiction while awaiting extradition to New Hampshire.
  • Robert Carr & a. v. Town of New London 161 A.3d 753 N.H. 2017
    State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146,155 (2008) (“[A]n interpretation that renders statutory language superfluous and irrelevant is not a proper interpretation.”).
  • State of New Hampshire v. James Perry 166 N.H. 716 N.H. 2014
    In the alternative, the defendant urges us to “overrule King and apply the Biggers factors when the State seeks to elicit a witness’s first identification in- court.” “We do not lightly overrule a prior opinion.” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 153 (2008).
  • State v. Moussa 53 A.3d 630 N.H. 2012
    He also notes that we will avoid an interpretation that renders a statutory term superfluous or that leads to an absurd result.
  • Chase Home for Children v. New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families 34 A.3d 1195 N.H. 2011
    We interpret statutes to give meaning to every word and phrase.
  • State v. Marshall 34 A.3d 540 N.H. 2011
    State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 151 (2008); see RSA 626:8, III, IV (2007) (setting forth requirements for accomplice liability).
  • State v. Quintero 34 A.3d 612 N.H. 2011
    no single factor is wholly determinative,” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 154 (2008), because “the doctrine of stare decisis is not one to be either rigidly applied or blindly followed.” State v. Ramos, 149 N.H. 118, 127 (2003) (quotation omitted).
  • Ocasio v. Federal Express Corp. 33 A.3d 1139 N.H. 2011
    “We do not lightly overrule a prior opinion.” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 153 (2008).
  • State v. Winward 20 A.3d 338 N.H. 2011
    While an indictment that charges the defendant as a principal puts a defendant on notice to prepare a defense as to both principal and *539 accomplice liability, State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 151 (2008), we have also “consistently stated that language in an indictment alleging that a defendant acted ‘in concert with’ another is sufficient to charge the defendant both as a principal and as an accomplice,” State v. Munson, 146 N.H. 712, 716 (2001) (quotations and ellipsis omitted).
  • State v. Mendola 8 A.3d 127 N.H. 2010
    To prevail, the defendant must show that the trial court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of her case.
  • Kalil v. Town of Dummer Zoning Board of Adjustment 159 N.H. 725 N.H. 2010
    “We do not lightly overrule a prior opinion.” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 153 (2008).
  • Kalil v. TOWN OF DUMMER 992 A.2d 725 N.H. 2010
    "We do not lightly overrule a prior opinion."
  • State v. Young 986 A.2d 497 N.H. 2009
    the accomplice shared the requisite mental state for the offense.” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 151 (2008).
  • State v. Dodds 982 A.2d 377 N.H. 2009
    When interpreting statutes, we look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
  • State v. Wamala 972 A.2d 1071 N.H. 2009
    We will neither consider what the legislature might have said nor add words that it did not see fit to include.