Cited by
Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Duran, 960 A.2d 697.
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State v. Allore
2025 N.H. 33
N.H. 2025
State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 155 (2008) (“[A]n interpretation that renders statutory language superfluous and irrelevant is not a proper interpretation.”).
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In the Matter of Molly Blaisdell and Robert Blaisdell
N.H. 2021
State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 157 (2008) (“Under the second.
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Union Leader Corporation & a. v. Town of Salem
N.H. 2020
For the second factor “we inquire into ‘the cost of a rule’s repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied reasonably on the rule’s continued application.’” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 157 (2008) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
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Seacoast Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth
N.H. 2020
Stare decisis, “the idea that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions,” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015), commands great respect in a society governed by the rule of law, and we do not lightly overrule a prior opinion, State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 153 (2008).
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State of New Hampshire v. Paulson Papillon
N.H. 2020
State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 151 (2008); see State v. Anthony, 151 N.H. 492, 493-95 (2004).
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Clark v. N.H. Dep't of Emp't Sec.
201 A.3d 652
N.H. 2019
Because we must interpret the statute as a whole and presume that the legislature does not use superfluous language, State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 155, 960 A.2d 697 (2008), we conclude that the speech, disclosure, and full criticism of non-confidential and non-privileged content must be discussed "publicly" to receive protection under the statute.
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Michelle Clark v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security & a.
N.H. 2019
Because we must interpret the statute as a whole and presume that the legislature does not use superfluous language, State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 155 (2008), we conclude that the speech, disclosure, and full criticism of non-confidential and non- privileged content must be discussed “publicly” to receive protection under the statute.
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State v. Luis Lopez
N.H. 2018
o “any jail or any other place” is entitled to “credit against both the maximum and minimum terms of his sentence equal to the number of days during which the prisoner was confined in jail awaiting and during trial prior to the imposition of sentence and not under any sentence of confinement.” The statute applies to time confined in another jurisdiction while awaiting extradition to New Hampshire.
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Robert Carr & a. v. Town of New London
161 A.3d 753
N.H. 2017
State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146,155 (2008) (“[A]n interpretation that renders statutory language superfluous and irrelevant is not a proper interpretation.”).
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State of New Hampshire v. James Perry
166 N.H. 716
N.H. 2014
In the alternative, the defendant urges us to “overrule King and apply the Biggers factors when the State seeks to elicit a witness’s first identification in- court.” “We do not lightly overrule a prior opinion.” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 153 (2008).
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State v. Moussa
53 A.3d 630
N.H. 2012
He also notes that we will avoid an interpretation that renders a statutory term superfluous or that leads to an absurd result.
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Chase Home for Children v. New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families
34 A.3d 1195
N.H. 2011
We interpret statutes to give meaning to every word and phrase.
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State v. Marshall
34 A.3d 540
N.H. 2011
State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 151 (2008); see RSA 626:8, III, IV (2007) (setting forth requirements for accomplice liability).
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State v. Quintero
34 A.3d 612
N.H. 2011
no single factor is wholly determinative,” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 154 (2008), because “the doctrine of stare decisis is not one to be either rigidly applied or blindly followed.” State v. Ramos, 149 N.H. 118, 127 (2003) (quotation omitted).
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Ocasio v. Federal Express Corp.
33 A.3d 1139
N.H. 2011
“We do not lightly overrule a prior opinion.” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 153 (2008).
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State v. Winward
20 A.3d 338
N.H. 2011
While an indictment that charges the defendant as a principal puts a defendant on notice to prepare a defense as to both principal and *539 accomplice liability, State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 151 (2008), we have also “consistently stated that language in an indictment alleging that a defendant acted ‘in concert with’ another is sufficient to charge the defendant both as a principal and as an accomplice,” State v. Munson, 146 N.H. 712, 716 (2001) (quotations and ellipsis omitted).
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State v. Mendola
8 A.3d 127
N.H. 2010
To prevail, the defendant must show that the trial court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of her case.
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Kalil v. Town of Dummer Zoning Board of Adjustment
159 N.H. 725
N.H. 2010
“We do not lightly overrule a prior opinion.” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 153 (2008).
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Kalil v. TOWN OF DUMMER
992 A.2d 725
N.H. 2010
"We do not lightly overrule a prior opinion."
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State v. Young
986 A.2d 497
N.H. 2009
the accomplice shared the requisite mental state for the offense.” State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 151 (2008).
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State v. Dodds
982 A.2d 377
N.H. 2009
When interpreting statutes, we look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
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State v. Wamala
972 A.2d 1071
N.H. 2009
We will neither consider what the legislature might have said nor add words that it did not see fit to include.