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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Gallagher, 951 A.2d 130.

15 citing documents.

  • Dianna Rudder v. Director, New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles N.H. 2022
    Likewise, in State v. Gallagher, 157 N.H. 421, 423 (2008), we held that the literal interpretation of a DUI sentencing statute would lead to “disproportionate results among people who have committed the same 5 offenses.” Absent a plausible explanation for such an outcome, we held that a literal reading of the statute wou
  • State of New Hampshire v. Oscar Quinta N.H. 2015
    The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.
  • State v. Brooks 164 N.H. 272 N.H. 2012
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.
  • State v. Davidson 44 A.3d 454 N.H. 2012
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.
  • State v. Etienne 35 A.3d 523 N.H. 2011
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.
  • State v. Gardner 34 A.3d 665 N.H. 2011
    We are the final arbiters of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.
  • State v. Pandelena 13 A.3d 239 N.H. 2010
    “In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Gallagher, 157 N.H. 421, 422 (2008).
  • State v. Mohamed 986 A.2d 649 N.H. 2009
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.
  • State v. McKeown 986 A.2d 583 N.H. 2009
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.
  • State v. Hynes 978 A.2d 264 N.H. 2009
    Resolution of this issue requires that we interpret RSA 637:5, II(i), which presents a question of law that we review de novo.
  • In Re Zachary G. 982 A.2d 367 N.H. 2009
    See, e.g., State v. Gallagher, 157 N.H. 421, 425 (2008); cf. In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 381 (1983) (declining to treat as jurisdictional the court’s failure to observe sixty-day period for the disposition of parental rights termination petition).
  • State v. Wamala 972 A.2d 1071 N.H. 2009
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.
  • In Re Huff 969 A.2d 428 N.H. 2009
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.
  • State v. Pratte 959 A.2d 200 N.H. 2008
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.
  • State v. Gubitosi 958 A.2d 962 N.H. 2008
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.