Cited by

RSA 604-A:9, III, V, VI; see also State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 598 (2008) (we interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation).

Moran, 158 N.H. at 321 (“We do not consider legislative history to construe a statute that is clear on its face.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 602 (2008) (describing the rule of lenity as a rule of statutory construction “for interpreting criminal statutes where the legislature failed to articulate its intent unambiguously” (quotation omitted)).

State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 602 (2008) (stating that the “rule of lenity serves as a guide for interpreting criminal statutes where the legislature failed to articulate its intent unambiguously”).

The “rule of lenity serves as a guide for interpreting criminal statutes where the legislature failed to articulate its intent unambiguously.” State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 602 (2008) (quotation omitted).

on sentences in excess of one year.” RSA 651:6,11(a) (emphasis added); see State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 599-600 (2008).

In 2003, the legislature amended RSA 651:6 to bring it into compliance with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi *597 v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 603 (2008); see Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.

“A guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to be valid.” State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 603 (2008) (quotation omitted).

on sentences” phrase in RSA 651:6, 11(a) renders the statutory language “not simply ambiguous, but incomprehensible.” For support, the defendant relies primarily on our opinion in State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596 (2008).

If a statute is ambiguous, we will consider legislative history to aid our analysis.

Cf State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 603 (2008) (applying rule of lenity to resolve statutory ambiguity in favor of defendant because “neither the [statutory] language nor the legislative history [of the statute] clearly establish what the legislature intended”).

cf. State v. Dansereau, 157 N.H. 596, 603 (2008) (declining to adopt general rule “that, when a sentence is illegal, a guilty plea is involuntary because the defendant has not been informed of the direct consequences of his plea, and, thus, the plea must be vacated”).

We are the final arbiters of the legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

We are the final arbiters of the legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.