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r “proposed testimony is not the product of reliable methods.” The defendant argued, inter alia, that Scarneo’s methodology was unreliable because it did not satisfy the four factors set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993), and codified in RSA 516:29-a, II (2021), and, therefore, her testimony was inadmissible under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702.

When the application of a scientific methodology is challenged as unreliable, “outright exclusion of the evidence in question is warranted only if the methodology was so altered by a deficient application as to skew the methodology itself.” State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 88 (2008) (quotation omitted).

it should be tested by the adversary process— competing expert testimony and active cross-examination—rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.” State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 88 (2008).

it should be tested by the adversary process – competing expert testimony and active cross-examination – rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.” State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 88 (2008) (quotation omitted).

To be admissible, however, expert testimony must rise to a threshold level of reliability.

The overall purpose of Rule 702 is to ensure that a fact- finder is presented with reliable and relevant evidence, not flawless evidence.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

This is the second time that this case has been before us. See State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77 (2008).

We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language it did not see fit to include.

We begin by examining the language of the statute, State v. Whittey, 149 N.H. 463, 467 (2003), and ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used, State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 84 (2008).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.

We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.

We are the final arbiters of the legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

“Section II of RSA 516:29-a unambiguously codifies the four Daubert factors we applied in Baker Valley, and section 1(b) codifies Daubert’s requirement that the court preliminarily assess ‘whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.’ ” State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 85 (2008) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93; citation omitted).