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The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo.

Therefore, although this factor “weighs in [the defendant’s] favor, it does not do so heavily.” See State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 343 (2008) (holding that the third factor of the Barker analysis did not weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor because “he waited nearly six months from the time the State entered the nolle prosequi and approximately ten months from the date of his indictment” to assert his speedy trial right).

tence in failing to prosecute undoubtedly indicates prejudice towards the defendant,” and that the State’s “lack of due diligence, [and] bad faith efforts combine to present an oppressive delay.” In determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated under the Federal Constitution, we apply the four-part test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

Polonsky v. Town of Bedford, 173 N.H. 226, 230 (2020); see State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 340 (2008) (the constitutionality of a statute as applied is a question of law).

State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 340 (2008); see also Bleiler, 155 N.H. at 701 (stating that vagueness may invalidate a statute if the statute “fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits”).

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

“To preserve a state constitutional claim, the defendant must: (1) raise it in the trial court; and (2) specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution in his brief.” State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 340 (2008).

Because the defendant rests his double jeopardy *34 argument on federal grounds only, we restrict our analysis accordingly.

Accordingly, lest there be any confusion, where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an indictment under the Federal Constitution, our state courts must address the claim.

“A statute is not unconstitutionally vague as long as its prohibitions are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with.” State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 340 (2008) (quotation omitted).

Under the third factor, we consider the strength of a defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial.

We defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous, and consider de novo the court’s conclusions of law with respect to those factual findings.

We note that the defendant failed to raise a state constitutional claim in the trial court; we, therefore, confine our constitutional analysis to the requirements of the Federal Constitution.

We note that the defendant does not cite a provision of the State Constitution; we therefore confine our constitutional analysis to the requirements of the Federal Constitution.

“A statute is not unconstitutionally vague as long as its prohibitions are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with.” State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 340 (2008) (quotation omitted).

I, art. 15; see State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 341 (2008); State v. Lachapelle, 133 N.H. 1, 3 (1990) (mem.

A statute is not unconstitutionally vague “as long as its prohibitions are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with.” State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 340 (2008) (quotations omitted).