Cited by

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 58 (2008) (distinguishing “dissipation” of assets from “diminution” of assets, and declining to read an intent or timing element into RSA 458:16-a, II(f)).

Given our conclusion that the record supports the trial court’s ruling that Wife intentionally dissipated the Panama property, we need not consider the court’s alternative ruling that the transfer of the property warrants an unequal distribution of the estate under RSA 458:16-a, II(f) and In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53 (2008).

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 62 (2008).

“An award of attorney’s fees must be grounded upon statutory authorization, a court rule, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception to the rule that each party is responsible for paying his or her own counsel fees.” In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 63 (2008) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 63 (2008).

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 63 (2008).

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 63 (2008).

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 61-62 (2008).

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 56 (2008).

The husband relies upon In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 63 (2008), to argue that the trial court erred by not justifying its decision not to find the wife in contempt.

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 64 (2008).

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 61- 62 (2008).

By failing to consider these alleged facts, she contends, the trial court acted contrary to In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 59 (2008), in which we held: 12 [I]n applying RSA 458:16-a, II(f) to support an unequal distribution of assets due to a spouse’s conduct which resulted in a diminution in value of property, a trial court must consider factors such as: conduct which

In 10 the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 61 (2008) (vacating trial court’s denial of a motion for contempt where trial court erred in a factual finding that formed the basis of contempt motion).

The petitioner’s remaining arguments that enforcement proceedings cannot be “reasonably anticipated” are either inadequately developed, see In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 64 (2008), or based upon a mischaracterization of the affidavit.

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 64 (2008).

In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 58 (2008).