Cited by

State v. Kepple, 155 N.H. 267, 269 (2007); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

On appeal, if we determine that a defendant has failed to meet either prong of the test, we need not consider the other one.

On appeal, when we determine that a defendant has failed to meet either prong of the test, we need not consider the other one.

State v. Kepple, 155 N.H. 267, 269 (2007); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

In order for the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice from the failure to file a motion to dismiss based on intentional prosecutorial overreach, he must show that such a motion would properly have been granted.

Because the standard for determining whether a petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under both the State and Federal Constitutions, we will examine the constitutional competency of counsel’s performance under the State Constitution, and rely upon federal case law only for guidance.

State v. Kepple, 155 N.H. 267, 269 (2007); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Because, in this case, the same analysis applies under the Federal Constitution, we will necessarily reach the same result under both constitutions.

4 to “strongly think about whether or not you want to take this case to trial, because the sentence could be a lot worse.” The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires a showing of: (1) constitutionally deficient representation by counsel; and (2) actual prejudice to the defendant.

“Because the standard for determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under both the State and Federal Constitutions, we will examine the constitutional competency of counsel’s performance under the State Constitution, and rely upon federal case law only for guidance.” State v. Kepple, 155 N.H. 267, 269 (2007).

“The prejudice analysis considers the totality of the evidence presented at trial.” State v. Kepple, 155 N.H. 267, 270 (2007).

State v. Wood, 150 N.H. 233, 236 (2003) (use of the term “child molester” did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Kepple, 155 N.H. 267, 271-72 (2007) (defense counsel not ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor’s characterization of defendant as a “predator”).

VI; see State v. Kepple, 155 N.H. 267, 269 (2007).

To meet this prong of the test, the defendant must show that counsel made such egregious errors that he failed to function as the counsel the State Constitution guarantees.

Accordingly, we need not address the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test.

A failure to establish either prong requires a finding that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally defective.

Both Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant reasonably competent assistance of counsel.

We first examine the constitutional competency of counsel’s performance under the State Constitution, and rely upon federal case law only for guidance.

The State and Federal Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant reasonably competent assistance of counsel.