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We first examine the constitutional competency of counsel’s performance under the State Constitution and rely upon federal case law only for guidance.

We first examine the constitutional competency of counsel’s performance under the State Constitution and rely upon federal case law only for guidance.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); see also State v. Whittaker¸158 N.H. 762, 769 (2009).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); see also State v. Whittaker¸158 N.H. 762, 769 (2009).

“Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are not supported by the evidence or are erroneous as a matter of law, and we review the ultimate determination of whether each prong is met de novo.” State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768 (2009) (citation omitted).

Notably, here, because the judge who ruled on the motion to set aside the guilty verdict also presided at trial, the trial court is in a better position than we are to assess whether defense counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant.

See, e.g., State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 767 (2009) (concluding that alternative arguments supporting claim of error are not preserved if not first raised in trial court).

State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768 (2009); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 773 (2009) (“Provided that the trial court finds that the expert’s methodology is reliable, it is up to the fact finder to determine the weight and credibility to be accorded the expert’s testimony.”); see also Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 615-16 (2002).

State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 766 (2009); see also Wong, 125 N.H. at 620 (to sustain a conviction for negligent homicide – DUI, the State must establish a causal connection between the person’s driving under the influence, the subsequent collision, and the resulting death).

“We first address the deficient performance prong of the Strickland test, which turns upon a determination of whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768 (2009) (quotation omitted).

We examine the constitutional competency of counsel’s performance under the State Constitution, and rely upon federal case law to aid in our analysis.

Counsel’s conduct did not merely create a reasonable probability that, but for the failures to object, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

To satisfy the first prong of the test, the performance prong, the defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768 (2009) (quotation omitted); see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (stating that the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms).

To satisfy the first prong of the test, the performance prong, the defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768 (2009) (quotation omitted); see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (“[T]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” (quotation omitted)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 773 (2009) (stating that “it is up to the fact finder to determine the weight and credibility to be accorded the expert’s testimony”).

State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 405-12 (1990) (reversing denial of defendant’s motion for new trial because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance); cf. State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 767-75 (2009) (discussing merits of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in motion for new trial); State v. Croft, 145 N.H. 90, 91-95 (2000) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion for new trial because trial counsel was not ineffective); State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 29-32 (1998) (analyzin

Both prongs of the ineffectiveness inquiry involve mixed questions of law and fact.