Cited by

State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 775 (2007) (“A person who is clearly advised that he is free to leave is ordinarily not in custody.”).

In re B.C., 167 N.H. 338, 342 (2015); accord State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 772 (2007).

McKenna, 166 N.H. at 684 (holding that defendant was in custody in part due to the accusatory and confrontational character of the interrogation); State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 773-75 (2007) (same).

rt acknowledged that there are some facts suggesting that the defendant was in custody — the interview room was small and the defendant sat in the chair furthest from the door, the detectives initiated contact with the defendant at his place of business, and the questioning took place at the police station — when considering the “totality of the circumstances of the encounter,” State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 772 (2007) (quotation omitted), the court found that the defendant was not in custody

nt observes that our “unit of prosecution” jurisprudence “is probably not susceptible of ready harmonization.” He contends, however, that, although we have “allowed small differences to constitute separate patterns,” we have required “that there be some material differences in the acts to justify separate pattern allegations.” He cites State v. Richard, 147 N.H. 340 (2001), and State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768 (2007), to support his contention.

In State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768 (2007), the police investigated an allegation that the defendant had committed a sexual assault.

ATV Watch v. N.H. Dep’t of Transp., 161 N.H. 746, 752 (2011) (noting that we “will consider legislative history only if the statutory language is ambiguous” (quotation omitted)); State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 777 (2007) (noting that “the rule of lenity is applicable only where statutory ambiguity has been found” (quotation omitted)).

Thus, in determining whether a defendant is subject to multiple punishments for the same offense, we must determine the unit of prosecution intended by the legislature.

To the extent the defendant is arguing that the grabbing, pushing, and pinning charges constituted a single “unit of prosecution” for purposes of the Federal Constitution, we examine RSA 631:2-a, I(a) to determine the unit of prosecution intended by the legislature, and apply the so-called rule of lenity only if the statute is ambiguous.

“Because the ultimate determination of custody requires an application of a legal standard to historical facts, it is not merely a factual question but a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 772 (2007) (quotation omitted).

‘We will not overturn the trial court’s factual findings relevant to the question of custody unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 772-73 (2007).

“Custody entitling a defendant to Miranda protections requires formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 772 (2007) (quotation omitted).

“[T]o read such a limit into the statute would undermine its very purpose.” State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 777 (2007) (construing RSA 632-A:2).

Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are not supported by the evidence or are erroneous as a matter of law, Kepple, 155 N.H. at 270, and we review the ultimate determination of whether each prong is met de novo, see State v. Jennings, 155 N.H. 768, 772 (2007).