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Adopting such a rigid definition of unconscionability would be inconsistent with the court’s “broad and flexible equitable powers which allow [the court] to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation,” Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage 6 Co., 155 N.H. 19, 24 (2007) (quotation omitted), that underlie the constructive trust remedy.

“The propriety of awarding equitable relief rests in the sound discretion of the trial court to be exercised according to the circumstances and exigencies of the case.” Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 24 (2007).

Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 24 (2007).

Equitable subrogation “is a broad doctrine, which is given liberal application.” Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 27 (2007).

App. Div. 2013) (“Since the power of attorney was forged and, as a result, was void, the subject deed and mortgage are, therefore, also void.”); Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 22-23 (2007) (holding that a mortgage, which contained a forged signature and did not satisfy the statutory formalities of execution, could not constitute a charge on the homestead right).

Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 24 (2007).

Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 24 (2007).

“The court has broad and flexible equitable powers which allow it to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation.” Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 24 (2007) (quotation omitted).

Conant v. O’Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 649 (2015); see Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 24 (2007) (“We will uphold a trial court’s equitable order unless it constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion.”).

“In conducting our review, we accord deference to the trial court’s findings of historical fact, where those findings are supported by evidence in the record.” Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 21 (2007).

Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 22 (2007).

Even if we assume, without deciding, that the attorney was negligent, and further assume that such negligence could be imputed to TD Bank, as we have previously explained, “negligence on the part of a surety does not invalidate the right to subrogate.” Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 28 (2007); see Fifield v. Mayer, 79 N.H. 82, 85-86 (1918).

Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 24 (2007).

In Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 22-23 (2007), we held that for a mortgage to be a “charge” on the homestead right “according to law,” it must satisfy the requirements of RSA 480:5-a.

Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 22 (2007).

Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 22, 921 A.2d 369 (2007).

“We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.” Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 22 (2007).

“In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 22 (2007).

Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 155 N.H. 19, 22 (2007).