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“Because this issue poses a question of constitutional law, we review it de novo.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 636 (2009) (quotation omitted).

He argues, citing Pate and State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 641 (2009), that “[o]nce the trial court possesses a legitimate doubt regarding a defendant’s competence and the procedure and processes designed to safeguard that right have been triggered, a defendant cannot waive those processes.” Neither Pate nor Veale, however, stands for that proposition.

“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 637 (2009) (quotation omitted).

“Law of the land in this article means due process of law.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 636 (2009) (quotation omitted).

“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 637 (2009) (quotation omitted).

“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 637 (2009) (quotation omitted).

“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 637 (2009) (quotation omitted).

Even if I agreed that Johnson’s analysis of RSA 91-A:3, II(a) rested solely upon so narrow a ground, RSA 91-A:3, II(c) is rooted in a legislative concern for protecting a person’s reputation — an interest at least as significant as the public employment interest at issue in Johnson, if not more significant.5 See State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 638-39 (2009) (finding “ample support in our jurisprudence for the proposition that reputational stigma can, by itself, constitute a deprivation of liberty

“Because this issue poses a question of constitutional law, we review it de novo.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 636 (2009) (quotation omitted).

Because this argument raises a 6 question of constitutional law, our review is de novo.

he “Laurie List” is not available to members of the public generally, placement on the list all but guarantees that information about the officers will be disclosed to trial courts and/or defendants or their counsel any time the officers testify in a criminal case, thus potentially affecting their reputations and professional standing with those with whom they work and interact on a regular basis.

We have held that “law of the land” means due process of law.

See, e.g., State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 638-39 (2009) (holding that reputation alone is a sufficient interest to require state due process protection and rejecting the federal “stigma-plus” approach); State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995) (requiring State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that undisclosed exculpatory evidence would not have af

The phrase “law of the land” means due process of law.

Because the Federal Constitution does not provide any greater protection than does the State Constitution with regard to the defendant’s procedural due process claims, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution.

“Law of the land in this article means due process of law.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 636 (quotation omitted), cert.

State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 639 (quotation omitted), cert.

“Law of the land in this article means due process of law.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 636, cert.

“Our threshold determination in a procedural due process claim is whether the challenged procedures concern a legally protected interest.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 637, cert.

Trial courts have the inherent authority and obligation to order an initial psychiatric or psychological evaluation of a defendant to determine competency to stand trial.