Cited by

However, “a lack of ambiguity in a statute or ordinance precludes application of the administrative gloss doctrine.” Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 502 (2007).

” language and, therefore, are not relevant to the issue before us. To the extent that Alpha Delta is arguing that these zoning decisions are proof of selective enforcement by the Town of its zoning ordinance, we agree with the ZBA that “[t]he mere fact that a Town may have been lax in its enforcement in the past does not prohibit enforcement in the present.” See Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 499 (2007).

nforming uses to continue indefinitely, see, e.g., Guy v. Town of Temple, 157 N.H. 642, 644 (2008) (noting that pre- existing, non-conforming uses “may be continued indefinitely” under ordinance), and ruled that if the objective of the ordinance was to eliminate non-conformity as soon as possible, then the village could have drafted the ordinance differently, see Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 495 (2007) (noting that “we will not guess what the drafters of the ordinance might ha

The interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law, which we review de novo.

“The interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 494 (2007).

Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 494 (2007) (quotation omitted).

State v. Hofland, 151 N.H. 322, 325 (2004) (quotation omitted); see Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 499 (2007); Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 473-74 (2004); Pope v. Little Boar’s Head Dist., 145 N.H. 531, 535 (2000); Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283 (1987); State v. Monahan, 125 N.H. 17, 26 (1984); State v. Pinsince, 105 N.H. 38, 41 (1963).

However, “a lack of ambiguity in a statute or [an] ordinance precludes application of the administrative gloss doctrine.” Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 502 (2007).

Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, LLC, 155 N.H. 491, 502 (2007).

Town of Windham v. Alfond, 129 N.H. 24, 32 (1986); City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 470 (1984); cf. Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 499-500 (2007) (mere showing of historical laxity in enforcement is not sufficient to establish conscious, intentional discrimination necessary to bar enforcement of ordinance); see also Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 89-90 (2008) (“agency nonenforcement of a federal statute is not the same as a policy of a

Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 494-95, 926 A.2d 261 (2007) (citations omitted).

Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 494-95 (2007) (citations omitted).

*97 I We draw the facts from the certified record, the trial court’s order, and our prior decision in Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491 (2007).

The construction of the terms of a zoning ordinance is a question of law, which we review de novo.

Because the traditional rules of statutory construction generally govern our review, the words and phrases of an ordinance should be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.

cf. Cherry, 150 N.H. at 725 (declining to address validity of ordinance, but stating that DES permit does not prove compliance with ordinance and that “municipality is not estopped from creating more restrictive rules for wetlands issues than those required by the Wetlands Board” (quotation and brackets omitted)); Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 501 (2007) (quoting language from Cherry in rejecting due process argument).

Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 494 (2007) (“If our review of the evidence does not reveal any genuine issue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the trial court’s decision.” (quotation omitted)).