Cited by

State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 252 (2007) (holding that we were “unable to decide whether the proposed cross- examination was permissible under Rule 403 as a matter of law” and remanding “to the trial court for resolution in the first instance”).

State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 252-53 (2007) (quotations and ellipses omitted).

We accord the trial court considerable deference in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403, and we will not disturb its decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Nor do we hold that cross-examination as to general credibility evidence is entitled to the same level of constitutional protection as cross- examination on evidence adduced to show bias, motive or prejudice.

We have held that, incident to the rights guaranteed under Part I, Article 15, is the opportunity to impeach a witness’s credibility through cross-examination.

We have since clarified that to introduce extrinsic evidence of prior allegations of sexual assault, the defendant must demonstrate that the allegations were “demonstrably false,” which we have interpreted to mean “clearly and convincingly untrue.” State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 250 (2007) (quotations omitted).

en the unique facts of this case and not outweighed by substantial prejudice,” and that “[t]his is particularly so given the undisputed fact that the [victim] falsely testified in a prior case regarding [A.A.].” However, the court denied the defendant’s request to cross-examine the victim about her allegations against V.A., G.B., and M.G., ruling that “[t]he factors set forth in [State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246 (2007)] weigh against permitting such cross-examination.” On appeal, the defendant argu

“Rule 403 is an exclusionary rule that cuts across the rules of evidence.” State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 251 (2007) (quotation omitted); see N.H. R. Ev.

The trial court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, and we will not upset its ruling absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

We accord the trial court considerable deference in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403, and we will not disturb its decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

We accord the trial court considerable deference in determining whether probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and we will not disturb its decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

We conclude that the trial court’s decision did not “impermissibly limit the defendant’s ability to effectively impeach the principal witness against him at trial in violation of Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution.” State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 254 (2007) (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

A trial court has broad discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination or the admissibility of evidence, and we will not upset its ruling absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Thus, we cannot say the trial court’s ruling exceeded its “broad discretion to fix the limits of cross-examination.” State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 253 (2007).

State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 256 (2007); see also Sprague, 146 N.H. at 336 (“[T]he IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction.”).

We address first the defendant’s argument under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, citing federal opinions for guidance only.

uthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness____ Although Rule 608(b) permits a cross-examiner to inquire into conduct that is probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, the examiner must generally “take the answer as the witness gives it.” State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 249 (2007).

State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 252-53 (2007) (quotations omitted).