Cited by

The trial court then relied on case law that had developed in the psychotherapist-patient privilege context, in which we held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege may be pierced upon a finding of “essential need.” See Desclos v. S. N.H. Med.

Ctr., 153 N.H. 607, 615-16 (2006), the court reasoned that the availability of alternative sources was a relevant consideration only when dealing with privileged information.

Ctr., 153 N.H. 607, 611 (2006) (listing circumstances in which trial court may compel disclosure of privileged materials).

To obtain such an order here, the appellants argue, the Board must establish a sufficient basis for the court to pierce the patient’s privilege, which means meeting the standard articulated in cases such as Desclos v. Southern New Hampshire Medical Center, 153 N.H. 607, 616-17 (2006).

Ctr., 153 N.H. 607, 610 (2006) (trial court’s decisions on the management of discovery and the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Ctr., 153 N.H. 607, 610 (2006), and defer to the trial court’s factual findings as long as they are supported by the evidence and are not erroneous as a matter of law.

Relying upon Desclos v. Southern New Hampshire Medical Center, 153 N.H. 607 (2006), the State argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard in determining whether to disclose the records at issue.

Relying upon Desclos v. Southern New Hampshire Medical Center, 153 N.H. 607, 903 A.2d 952 (2006), the State argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard in determining whether to disclose the records at issue.

Ctr., 153 N.H. 607, 615-19 (2006) (requiring Payne protections for discovery of privileged psychotherapy records).

“To meet this standard, [Dr. Kleeman] must demonstrate that the trial court’s rulings were clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of h[is] case.” Desclos v. S. N.H. Med.