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When reviewing an order on a motion to suppress, we defer to the circuit court’s credibility determinations unless no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion after weighing the testimony.

“We defer to the trial court’s determinations of credibility unless no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion after weighing the testimony.” State v. Livingston, 153 N.H. 399, 402 (2006) (quotation omitted).

Blesdell-Moore, 166 N.H. at 189 (noting “the odor of burnt marijuana” is a “critical factor supporting reasonable suspicion”); State v. Livingston, 153 N.H. 399, 405 (2006) (holding the strong odor of burnt marijuana combined with defendant’s nervousness and bloodshot eyes provided officer with reasonable suspicion during stop of motor vehicle); see also State v. Gilson, 116 N.H. 230, 233 (1976) (“An officer with sufficient experience to recognize the odor of burning marijuan

State v. Livingston, 153 N.H. 399, 402 (2006) (observing that credibility determinations are within the province of the trial court).

“A voluntary consent free of duress and coercion is a recognized exception to the need for both a warrant and probable cause.” State v. Livingston, 153 N.H. 399, 405 (2006) (quotation omitted).

State v. Livingston, 153 N.H. 399, 408 (2006); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; State v. McGurk, 157 N.H. 765, 772 (2008); Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04.

We defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations unless no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion after weighing the testimony.

When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations unless no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion after weighing the testimony.

The trial court relied upon State v. Livingston, 153 N.H. 399 (2006), to support its ruling that Holland had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop.

“To determine whether a search has exceeded the scope of the permission granted, we ask whether under the circumstances surrounding the search, it was objectively reasonable for the officers conducting the search to believe that the defendant had consented to it.” State v. Livingston, 153 N.H. 399, 408 (2006).

fficer Doyle had not yet seized the defendant upon first speaking with him, see Beauchesne, 151 N.H. at 809, and because the defendant’s appearance and conduct created a reasonable suspicion that he was driving under the influence of alcohol, see Pepin, 155 N.H. at 366 (discussing reasonable suspicion), Officer Doyle lawfully administered additional field sobriety tests, see State v. Livingston, 153 N.H. 399, 404-05 (2006) (discussing proper scope of an investigatory stop), and arrested the defe

Our review of the district court’s order is de novo, except as to any controlling facts determined at the district court level in the first instance.

We defer to the trial court’s determinations of credibility unless no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion after weighing the testimony.