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[¶15] Finally, although we construe statutes to “make[] the least, rather than the most, change in the common law,” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 74 (2011), CIC points to no clear common law rule regarding the treatment of a contribution claim filed against an insurer whose assets are inadequate to pay its liabilities.3 In arguing that an insurer’s actual payments must determine the extent of a co-insurer’s right to contribution, CIC posits that “[c]ontri

As relevant to this appeal, the State, relying upon our decision in State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 70 (2011), sought to add the following language to the self- defense instruction: The defendant must reasonably believe that the amount of force that he used was necessary for self-defense or defense of others.

State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 81 (2011) (noting that justification defenses under RSA chapter 627 are pure defenses).

[¶19] “The purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 70 (2011) (quotation omitted).

State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 88 (2011) (Favorable evidence is evidence that is “admissible.

The person can use the amount of force which he believes is necessary under the circumstances, as long as, at the time, there were reasonable grounds for his belief.” See State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 70 (2011).

Ct. App. 2014); see State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 74 (2011) (court will not interpret statute to abrogate common law unless statute clearly expresses that intent).

Newly-discovered evidence may justify the granting of a new trial under RSA 526:1.

Newly-discovered evidence may justify the granting of a new trial under RSA 526:1.

We will affirm the trial court’s finding so long as there is evidence to support it.

State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 80-81 (2011); see RSA 626:7, I(a) (2016).

State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 85-86 (2011) (flight and false exculpatory statements are evidence of consciousness of guilt).

Newly-discovered evidence may justify the granting of a new trial under RSA 526:1.

State v. Colbath, 171 N.H. 626, 638 (2019); Edic, 169 N.H. at 590; State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 85-86 (2011).

“We have often stated that we will not interpret a statute to abrogate the common law unless the statute clearly expresses that intent.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 74 (2011) (quotation omitted).

RSA 627:1 (2016) (providing that conduct that is justifiable under RSA chapter 627 “constitutes a defense to any offense”); RSA 626:7, I(a) (2016) (providing that the State must disprove defenses beyond a reasonable doubt); see also State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 81 (2011) (explaining that the legislature has determined that defenses set forth in RSA chapter 627 constitute “pure defenses, and, thus, negating such a defense becomes an element of the offense that the State must prove beyond a reas

“In enacting legislation, the legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law: we will not construe a statute as abrogating the common law unless the statute clearly expresses such an intention.” State v. Hermsdorf, 4 135 N.H. 360, 363 (1992) (quotations omitted); see also State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 74 (2011) (“We have often stated that we will not interpret a statute to abrogate the common law unless the statute clearly expresses that intent.” (quotation omitted)).

State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 71 (2011) (applying de novo review when resolving a defendant’s claim that jury instruction reduced State’s burden of proof); see also United States v. Lopez, 500 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing de novo a claim that a jury instruction violated due process by creating an unconstitutional presumption or infere

RSA 627:4, I-II(a); State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 77 (2011).

Our conclusion is also supported by the principle of statutory construction that “the expression of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 73 (2011).

he trial court erred by instructing the jury that it “may also find that a sale occurred if the Defendant offered to sell or give control of drugs to another person but, in fact, no drugs were actually given or sold.” “The purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 70 (2011) (quotation omitted).

“The purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 70 (2011) (quotation omitted).

On the contrary, we impute knowledge among prosecutors in the same office, State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 90-91 (2011), and we also hold prosecutors responsible for at least the information possessed by certain government agencies, such as police departments or other regulatory authorities, that are involved in the matter that gives rise to the prosecution, see Theodosopoulos, 153 N.H. at 320.

“The purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 70 (2011) (quotation omitted).

Likewise, “[t]he interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we decide de novo.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 71 (2011) (quotation omitted).

“The purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” State 1).

“The purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 70 (2011) (quotation omitted).

The scope and wording of jury instructions are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court’s decision for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.

We have held that when there is “some evidence” that the defendant used force in defense of another, conduct “negating such a defense becomes an element of the offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 81 (2011); State v. Hast, 133 N.H. 747, 749-50 (1990).

Finally, we interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation.

“We determine whether the jury instructions adequately and accurately explain each element of the offense and reverse only if the instructions did not fairly cover the issues of law in the *435 case.” Davidson, 163 N.H. at 472 (quotation omitted); State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 80-81 (2011) (when a defendant raises self-defense “conduct negating the defense becomes an element of the charged offense” (quotation omitted)).

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we decide de novo.

When a defendant raises self-defense, “conduct negating the defense becomes an element of the charged offense, which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 80-81 (2011) (quotation and citation omitted).

State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 80-81 (2011) (self-defense); State v. Soto, 162 N.H. 708, 715-16 (2011) (provocation).

In construing the self-defense statute in the past, we have explained that deadly force is to be “used only when, and to the extent, ‘necessary’ ” and “should not be excessive in relation to the harm threatened.” State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 569 (2002); see State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 75 (2011).