Cited by

Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 452 (2005) (“When we interpret statutes that deal with the same subject matter, we consider all of the statutes when interpreting any one of them.”).

3 resulting injuries.” Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 453 (2005) (quotation and emphasis omitted).

Unless otherwise defined in a statute, “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.” RSA 21:2 (2012); see Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005).

must by definition be non-units.” The term “improvement,” as used in RSA 356-B:20, I, is not defined in the Act and, therefore, we ascribe to it its plain and ordinary meaning.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

The interpretation of RSA chapter 541-B is a question of law, which we review de novo.

We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

*358 When we interpret a rule of evidence, our primary guidepost for its meaning is the language of the rule itself.

We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

In matters of statutory interpretation, “[w]e are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005).

We ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to regulatory text.

We ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to regulatory text.

We first look to the language of the statute, Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005), and construe it “according to the common and approved usage of the language unless from the statute it appears that a different meaning was intended,” N.H. Resident Ltd. Partners of Lyme Timber v. N.H. Dep’t of Revenue Admin., 162 N.H. 98, 101 (2011) (quotation omitted).

The jury instruction at issue raises a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.

In interpreting a statute, we first examine the language of the statute itself, and, where possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.

We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used.

We review the trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo.

We review the trial court’s construction of RSA 507:7-d de novo.

We review the trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo.

We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

“We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005).

As the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, we review the trial court’s decision de novo.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

Our decision depends upon the interpretation of statutes, which presents a question of law that we review de novo.

Our decision depends upon the interpretation of statutes, which presents a question of law that we review de novo.

The plaintiffs next assert that RSA 508:14,1, does not apply “because the State did not ‘permit’ Nicholas, Michael and Jeffrey to access Silver Lake through its land, even if the State in fact does own the land the boys crossed to enter the lake.” See Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 454 (2005) (to qualify as an “occupant” under RSA 508:14, I, one must at least have the ability or authority to permit persons to use or enter the land).

Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 454, 879 A.2d 1161 (2005) (to qualify as an "occupant" under RSA 508:14, I, one must at least have the ability or authority to permit persons to use or enter the land).

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

Resolving this issue requires that we interpret RSA 458:7, VII, which permits a party to obtain a fault-based divorce “[w]hen either party is an habitual drunkard, and has been such for 2 years together.” The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

“When statutory terms are undefined, we ascribe to them their plain and ordinary meaning.” Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005).