Cited by

First, the plaintiff likens the 20-day statutory limit within which to hold an ALS hearing under RSA 265-A:31, I(c) to the statutory time limits in McCarthy, Fournier, and Russell C. See McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 646 (2005) (holding that failure to hold a hearing on a domestic violence petition within the time limit deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction because a protective order generally restrains a defendant’s liberty); State v. Fournier, 158 N.H. 441, 449 (2009) (holding

Relying upon McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643 (2005), the defendant argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the domestic violence petition when the hearing was not held within thirty days, as required by RSA 173-B:3, VII(a).

Relying upon McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643 (2005), the defendant argues that the court should have dismissed the petition for failing to hold the hearing within thirty days.

McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 652 (2005) (Broderick, C.J., dissenting) (observing that dismissal and refiling of domestic violence petition would “tread even further on the interests of both the victim and the accused” by subjecting them to an additional thirty-day waiting period).

The thirty-day time period is necessary both to protect the due process rights of the defendant, McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 646 (2005), and to advance the important purpose of the statutory scheme — “to preserve and protect the safety of the family unit for all family or household members by entitling victims of domestic violence to immediate and effective police protection and judicial relief,” In the Matter of Morrill and Morrill, 147 N

with a single employee bargaining committee.” See McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005) (“The use of the word ‘shall’ is generally regarded as a command.”).

McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005) (considering the legislature’s use of the word “shall” as a command, indicating a mandatory intent).

McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005) (“The use of the word ‘shall’ is generally regarded as a command; although not controlling, it is significant as indicating the intent that the statute is mandatory.”).

Although it is true that the 30-day timeframe set forth in RSA 173-B:3, VII protects the respondent’s right to timely challenge the restraints placed upon him by another’s allegations, see McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 646 (2005), that timeframe also promotes the overall purpose of RSA chapter 173-B of “entitling victims of domestic violence to immediate and effective police protection and judicial relief,” Knight, 161 N.H. at 744-45 (quotation omitted).

all be allowed a reasonable amount of time to address the panel of prospective jurors for the purpose of explaining such party’s claims, defenses, and concerns in sufficient detail to prompt jury reflection, probing, and subsequent disclosure of information, opinion, bias, or prejudices which might prevent a juror from attaining the requisite degree of neutrality required.”); McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005) (“The use of the word ‘shall’ is generally regarded as a command...

McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005) (“[U]se of the word ‘shall’ is generally regarded as a command.

McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005) (“[U]se of the word ‘shall’ is generally regarded as a command...

*134 DES concedes that the word “shall” in RSA 72:12-a is a mandatory command, see McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005), but argues that it acted reasonably and lawfully because Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which requires uniformity and equality in assessment and collection of property taxes, does not permit a tax exemption for the DuVernays’ septic system.

The use of the word “shall” is generally regarded as a command.

RSA 265-A:31 provides, in pertinent part: “[T]he hearing examiner shall issue his or her recommendation on the order of suspension or revocation within 15 days of the request for administrative review or the hearing date.” The use of the word “shall” is generally regarded as a command and usually indicates the legislature’s intent that the statute is mandatory.

In common parlance, the word "shall" is "used to express a command," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2085 (unabridged ed. 2002); see McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645, 886 A.2d 972 (2005), or to signify something that is required or mandatory, see Dancart Corp. v. St.

In common parlance, the word “shall” is “used to express a command,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2085 (unabridged ed. 2002); see McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005), or to signify something that is required or mandatory, see Dancart Corp. v. St.

“[T]he word ‘shall’ is generally regarded as a command; although not controlling, it is significant as indicating the intent that the statute is mandatory.” McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005).

This is especially so where the purpose of the statute is to protect private rights.” McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005).