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II On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in failing to award his attorney’s fees “in accordance with RSA 540-A:4 and RSA 358:10 for the necessity of responding to Defendant’s post-trial motions.” The plaintiff asserts that under Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471 (2006), a prevailing plaintiff in an appeal may recover for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to RSA 540-A:4, IX and that “there exists no limitation in RSA 540-A:4 on post-trial proceedings or attorney’s fees generate

However, when a trial court has not addressed a factual issue, but the record reveals that a reasonable fact finder necessarily would reach a certain conclusion, we may decide the issue as a matter of law.

Therefore, we ordinarily would remand this issue for determination in the first instance.

Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 480 (2006) (addressing the trial court’s refusal to hold a 4 We express no opinion as to the accuracy of this assertion.

The trial court’s exercise of its contempt power is discretionary.

Thus, we address the arguments regarding enhanced damages no further than to reiterate what we have held in a prior case: that a violation of RSA chapter 540- A does not, as a matter of law, entitle a plaintiff to enhanced damages under RSA 358-A:10.

In this regard, we note that one of the remedies provided for in the Consumer Protection Act is an award of $1,000 per violation, which can be multiplied by up to three times by the court if it determines that the defendant’s conduct was a willful or knowing violation of the Act.

In the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006); Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 473 (2006).

In Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 475-77 (2006), we rejected a tenant’s argument that RSA 358-A:10, read together with RSA 540-A:4, IX, entitled the tenant to enhanced damages.

6 contained explicit language providing that “each day that a violation continues shall constitute a separate violation.” See, e.g., Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 478 (2006) (interpreting RSA 540-A:4 (2007)); Town of Henniker v. Homo, 136 N.H. 88, 90 (1992) (interpreting RSA 236:114 (1993)).

Gilroy, 157 N.H. at 279 (quotation omitted); see Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 474-75, 478 (2006) (construing RSA 540-A:4, IX); Town of Henniker v. Homo, 136 N.H. 88, 88-90 (1993) (construing RSA 236:127).

After this general proscription, the CPA lists fifteen representative categories of unlawful acts that the legislature has determined constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

When construing its meaning, we first examine the language found in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used.

RSA 540-A:4, IX(a); RSA 358-A:10,1; Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 474-75, 478 (2006).

While the plaintiff concedes that the penalty exceeded the jurisdictional limit set forth in RSA 502-A:14, II, it counters that because RSA 676:17, I, subjects a person who violates a zoning ordinance to a civil penalty of $275 for the first offense “for each day that such violation is found to continue,” the court must view the penalty awarded as 154 separate awards in the amount of $275 each.

However, when the trial court has not addressed a factual issue, but the record reveals that a reasonable fact finder necessarily would reach a certain conclusion, we may decide the issue as a matter of law.

Porter, 144 N.H. at 100-01; see also Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 473 (2006); DeButts v. LaRoche, 142 N.H. 845, 847 (1998).

We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute.

As we are unable to decide whether the proposed cross-examination was permissible under Rule 403 as a matter of law, see Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 474 (2006), and as the State has not argued that any error was harmless, we remand this issue to the trial court for resolution in the first instance, see State v. Hall, 154 N.H. 180, 185 (2006).

However, remand is unnecessary when the record reveals that a reasonable fact finder necessarily would have reached a certain conclusion.

Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 473 (2006) (appellee was not entitled to review of trial court order where he failed to appeal the order or file a cross-appeal).