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Accordingly, we conclude that their due process argument is insufficiently developed, and we decline to consider it.

Any question that the defendant included in his notice of 6 appeal, but that he did not brief, is deemed waived.

Because a mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review, we decline to respond to these assertions.4 See State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 513 (2006) (declining to address defendant’s due process argument as he had not explained how his rights were violated and had only argued in “conclusory terms”).

The right to counsel and the right to self-representation are mutually exclusive; the exercise of one right nullifies the other.

In Gingras, the defendant was charged with, among other offenses, criminal threatening and reckless conduct arising out of a road-rage incident during which he 2The State does not dispute that there was “some evidence” to support a defense-of-others defense, and that the defendant therefore was entitled to have the jury instructed about the matter.

Although we 2 review a trial court’s findings concerning which words a defendant used to invoke his Miranda rights under the clearly erroneous standard, whether the defendant’s words constitute an invocation of his rights is a question of law, which we review de novo.

State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 513 (2006) (concluding that evidence relevant to the defendant’s intent carried “significant” probative value because his “intent was central to the trial”).

All issues that the defendant raised in her notice of appeal, but did not brief, are deemed waived.

When a defendant raises a claim under both the State and Federal Constitutions, we typically address his State claim first.

When intent is in serious dispute, the trial court is justified in assigning a high probative value to other bad acts evidence that tends to prove criminal mens rea with respect to the charged act.

Moreover, while we readily agree with the defendant that credibility determinations fall within the province of the trial court, see State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 519 (2006), the fact remains that it was the defendant’s burden to establish that his trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.

Because the defendant has raised his claim under both the State and Federal Constitutions, we would normally address his State claim first.

State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 516 (2006); see State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 636 (1985); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).

“[Bjecause the issue of the defendant’s intent was central to the trial of this matter, the probative value was significant.” State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 513 (2006).

We review the trial court’s decision not to give a jury instruction for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

The “clear proof’ requirement “is satisfied when the State presents evidence firmly establishing that the defendant, and not some other person, committed the prior act.” State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 512-13 (2006), cert.

The defendant was entitled to the requested jury instruction only “if there [was] some evidence to support a rational finding in favor of that defense.” State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 514 (2006), cert.

State v. Munoz, 157 N.H. 143, 148 (2008); State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 511 (2006), cert.

We have not, however, adopted the Crawford analysis as applicable in this State, see State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 511 (2006), cert.

Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, see State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 513 (2006), cert.

“Further, because the issue of the defendant’s intent was central to the trial of this matter, the probative value was significant.” State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 513 (2006), cert.

“Reliability [could] be inferred without more in a case where the evidence [fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id.; see State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 505 (2006), petition for cert.

We review the trial court’s decision not to give a jury instruction for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.