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The ward contends that the trial court’s finding that she was incapacitated with regard to these rights “was tantamount to creating new claims, without affording [her] any opportunity to oppose them before her liberty and autonomy were further significantly curtailed.” Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary, see Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005), we interpret the ward’s argument to be that she did not receive the notice required by RSA chap

Instead, the department supports its argument that Avery lacks standing with case law holding, for example, that the “plaintiffs lack[ed] standing because they cannot raise the constitutional claims of another,” Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005), and that “it [wa]s plain error to permit this imprisoned litigant who [wa]s unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a [section 1983] class action,” Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s second complaint for the following reasons: (1) the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim fails because Section 1983 exempts state agencies and state officials acting in their official capacity from its purview, see Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 42 (2005); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); (2) the plaintiff’s claims under the State Constitution fail because he has adequate common law and statutory remedi

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005) (“We decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary.”).

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005); see also McInerney, 791 F.3d at 1227.

To establish liability for tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the plaintiff had an economic relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant knew of this relationship; (3) the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with this relationship; and (4) the plaintiff was damaged by such interference.” Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 40-41 (2005) (emphases omitted).

Although the State does not challenge the petitioners’ standing to bring their Commerce Clause claim, “a party’s standing to bring suit is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, which may be addressed at any time.” Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005).

“To establish liability for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff had an economic relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant knew of this relationship; (3) the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with this relationship; and (4) the plaintiff was damaged by such interference.” Hughes v. N.H. Div of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 40-41 (2005) (citation omitted); see Roberts v. Gen.

Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary, see Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005), we first address the unsustainable exercise of discretion claim.

Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary, see Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005), we address the statutory issue and decline to address the constitutional issue.

See, e.g., Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 37 (2005) (contract rights can constitute vested property rights).

See, e.g., Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 37, 871 A.2d 18 (2005) (contract rights can constitute vested property rights).

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005).

As a general rule, such constitutional arguments cannot be raised by a party unless “the party’s own rights have been or will be directly affected.” Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005) (citation omitted).

“To establish liability for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff had an economic relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant knew of this relationship; (3) the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with this relationship; and (4) the plaintiff was damaged by such interference.” Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 40-41 (2005) (emphases omitted).

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 38-39 (2005).

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005).

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005).

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 34 (2005).

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 38-39 (2005).

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35 (2005).

“The constitutionality of a statute involves a question of law, which we review de novo.” Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 34 (2005).

Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme.” Hughes v. New Hampshire Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 38-39 (2005).

Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme.” Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 38-39 (2005).

We construe each statute as a whole, and if the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the statute to discern legislative intent.” Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 38 (2005).

Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 35-36 (2005).