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To demonstrate that the trial court exercised unsustainable discretion, the defendant must show that the ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.

State v. Yates, 152 N.H. 245, 251 (2005) (concluding that testimony characterizing an event as a crime were “highly and unfairly prejudicial”).

“We will not interpret a statute to require an illogical result.” State v. Yates, 152 N.H. 245, 255 (2005).

You *513 may give this evidence what weight you wish in determining an appropriate punishment, but your consideration is limited to a rational analysis of the evidence rather than simply an emotional response to it.” Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.

Citing State v. Yates, 152 N.H. 245 (2005), the defendant further argues that the limiting instruction was inadequate to purge the statements of their prejudicial effect.

Rather, the prejudice required to predicate reversible error is an undue tendency to induce a decision against the defendant on some improper basis, commonly one that is emotionally charged.

State v. Yates, 152 N.H. 245, 255 (2005); see General Electric Co. v. Dole, 105 N.H. 477, 479 (1964).

See, e.g., State v. Yates, 152 N.H. 245, 256 (2005) (“The legislature is not presumed to waste words or enact redundant provisions and whenever possible, every word of a statute should be given effect.”).

To prevail, the defendant must show that the trial court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.

“We accord the trial court considerable deference in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” State v. Yates, 152 N.H. 245, 249 (2005).

We review challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard and reverse only if the rulings are clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of a party’s case.

In State v. Yates, 152 N.H. 245 (2005), our first case addressing the duty of care element of RSA 639:3, I, we “determined that the [relevant] portion of RSA 639:3,1, imposes liability only upon individuals who have a familial, or similar/supervisory relationship with a child,” Yates, 152 N.H. at 259.

We accord the trial court considerable deference in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

In addition, the statutory scheme remaining after the repeal of former RSA 651:3, III is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, further necessitating review of legislative history.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

Relevancy determinations are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn such determinations absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.