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“[E]very statute which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective.” In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 772 (2005) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 773 (2005) (quotation omitted); cf. 16B Am.

Id.; see In the Matter of Goldman & Elliot, 151 N.H. 770, 774 (2005) (“A perfect vested right can be no other than such as is not doubtful, or depending on any contingency, but absolute, fixed, and certain.” (quotation omitted)); Church Mut.

“[T]o be vested, a right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of existing law; it must have become a title, legal or 7 equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from the demand of another.” In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 774 (2005) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 772 (2005).

“A perfect vested right can be no other than such as is not doubtful, or depending on any contingency, but absolute, fixed and certain.” In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 774 (2005) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 774, 868 A.2d 278 (2005) (quotation *162 omitted).

“[T]o be vested, a right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from the demand of another.” In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 774 (2005) (quotation omitted).

We have held that “every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective.” In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 772 (2005) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 772, 868 A.2d 278 (2005) (quotation omitted).

See, e.g., In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 772 (2005); Donovan, 152 N.H. at 61-62; In the Matter of Forcier & Mueller, 152 N.H. 463, 466 (2005).

In the Matter of Goldman and Elliot[t], 151 N.H. 770 (2005).

*543 While distinguishing substantive rights and liabilities from procedural rights and remedies is not a simple or formulaic matter, see In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 773 (2005), we find that the statute here affects the substantive rights of the parties.

In the Matter of Goldman & Elliot, 151 N.H. 770, 774 (2005).

We have interpreted that provision “to mean that every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective.” In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 772 (2005) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Goldman & Elliott, 151 N.H. 770, 772 (2005).