Cited by

In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628-29 (2004).

“[t]he child support guidelines turn on the obligor parent’s income available for support, and not on the parent’s net worth.” In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 166 N.H. 422, 436 (2014); see RSA 458-C:3 (2018) (establishing formula for calculating child support obligation based 4 upon net income, not assets); see also In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 632 (2004) (“Under our legislative scheme, assets are not ‘income’ for child support purposes.”); In the Matter of Plaisted & Plai

rt guidelines is “to ensure that both the custodial and non-custodial parents share in the support responsibility for their children, according to the relative percentage of each parent’s income” (emphasis added)).2 Moreover, this result furthers the other statutory purpose of child support, which is to “minimize the economic consequences of divorce to children.” In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 630 (2004) (quotation and brackets omitted); see 27C C.J.S.

Assets are not specifically included in this statutory definition and we have consistently held that “[t]he child support guidelines turn on the obligor parent’s income available for support, and not on the parent’s net worth.” Hampers, 166 N.H. at 436; see also In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 632 (2004) (“Under our legislative scheme, assets are not ‘income’ for child support purposes.”); In the Matter of Plaisted & Plaisted, 149 N.H. 522, 525 (2003) (“If the legislature had int

The statute’s broad language evinces the legislature’s intent to “minimize the economic consequences to children,” RSA 458-C:1 (Supp. 2013), in domestic relations cases by “mandat[ing] that an obligor’s entire income be considered.” In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 633 (2004) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628 (2004).

The statutory definition of gross income is broad; it is not limited to wages and wage equivalents, In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626,629 (2004), and it encompasses both earned and unearned income, RSA 458-C:2, IV.

In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628 (2004).

Similarly, in In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626 (2004), we stated that “RSA 458-C:7 grants parties the statutory right to seek review of an award three years after its issuance or at any time based upon a substantial change of circumstances.” Id.

This interpretation is consistent with the stated purpose of RSA chapter 458-C “[t]o minimize the economic consequences of divorce to children,” In *505 the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 630 (2004) (emphasis added; quotation and brackets omitted), and ensure that children are not deprived of a standard of living equal to that of the subsequent family of the parent paying child support, In the Matter of Dolan & Dolan, 147 N.H. 218, 221 (2001).

v. Town of Seabrook, 148 N.H. 519, 525-26 (2002) (“When construing a statute, we must give effect to all words in a statute and presume that the legislature did not enact superfluous or redundant words.”); cf. In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 629 (2004) (holding that legislature’s use of the term “annuities,” without qualification, indicated legislature’s intent to include all annuities, not just certain annuities, in “gross income”).

“Trial courts have broad discretion in reviewing and modifying child support orders.” In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628 (2004).

In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628-29 (2004).

In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628 (2004).

In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628-29 (2004).

In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628 (2004).

In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628 (2004).

In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 628 (2004).