Cited by

See, e.g., State v. Johnston, 150 N.H. 448, 456-57 (2004) (observing that Miranda addresses Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory self- incrimination rather than Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241 (“Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ waiver of

Because the Federal Constitution provides no greater protection than the State Constitution under these circumstances, see United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2003); State v. Johnston, 150 N.H. 448, 454 (2004), we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution.

was coerced.” “A voluntary consent free of duress and coercion is a recognized exception to the need of both a warrant and probable cause.” State v. Johnston, 150 N.H. 448, 453 (2004) (quotation omitted).

We have previously recognized that certain property surrounding a home, often described as curtilage, deserves the same protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as the home itself.

Like community caretaking, a “voluntary consent free of duress and coercion is a recognized exception to the need of both a warrant and probable cause.” State v. Johnston, 150 N.H. 448, 453 (2004) (quotation omitted).

State v. *113 Johnston, 150 N.H. 448, 452 (2004); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-84 (1984).

Compare Goss, 150 N.H. at 48-49 (holding defendant has reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of black garbage bags left out for collection), with State v. Johnston, 150 N.H. 448, 452 (2004) (holding defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in curtilage to his home when there was no gate, he had not posted “no trespassing” signs and the driveway was visible from the street).

On appeal, we will accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous.

“A voluntary consent free of duress and coercion is a recognized exception to the need of both a warrant and probable cause.” State v. Johnston, 150 N.H. 448, 453 (2004) (quotation omitted).

We recognize that the sanctity of the home is jealously guarded by a long line of cases.

When reviewing a trial court’s motion to suppress, we accept the trial court’s findings unless they are unsupported by the record or clearly erroneous.

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they are unsupported by the record or clearly erroneous.

The voluntariness of the consent is a question of fact determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.

A voluntary consent free of duress and coercion is a recognized exception to the need for both a warrant and probable cause.