Cited by

Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 38 (2004).

Contract actions protect the interest in having promises performed.” Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 38 (2004) (quotation omitted).

Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 43 (2004).

n which SAU 95 was created; (4) the trial court made findings of fact and weighed the evidence; (5) whether she was constructively discharged and retaliated against are questions of fact for a jury; (6) the acts she reported violated more than school board policies and were not “fanciful or inconsequential”; (7) her situation was comparable to that of the employee in Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30 (2004); and (8) she experienced adverse job consequences at SAU 95, including being assi

Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 43-44 (2004).

Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 41 (2004) (stating exhaustion not required when administrative procedures would not necessarily correct hostile work environment or authorize award of back pay).

Although we have utilized this test in cases involving claims predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior, see, e.g., id.; Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 39-40 (2004), we agree with the trial court that it is instructive here.

This argument is also unavailing, however, because the plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation, see Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 48 (2004), and the trial court’s dismissal was not based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Although the City’s petition could perhaps have been drafted with more precision, New Hampshire is a notice pleading jurisdiction, and, “[a]s such, we take a liberal approach to the technical requirements of pleadings.” Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 43 (2004) (quotation omitted).

“We have consistently recognized that the prevailing rule in employment law is that in the absence of an employment contract, both parties are free at any time to terminate the employment relationship, with or without cause.” Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 37 (2004) (quotations and brackets omitted).

However, “[w]e have recognized that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is flexible, and that exhaustion is not required under certain circumstances.” Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 40 (2004).

(quotation and brackets omitted); see Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 48 (2004) (“When a qualified immunity defense is pressed after a jury verdict, the evidence must be construed in the light most hospitable to the party that prevailed at trial.” (quotation omitted)).

The prevailing rule in New Hampshire is that, absent an agreement to the contrary, employment contracts are “at-will,” meaning that “both parties are free at any time to terminate the employment relationship, with or without cause.” Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 37 (2004) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Although we have held that to establish liability for constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show that her employer rendered her working conditions so difficult and intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign, Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 42 (2004), we have not decided when such a claim accrues.

Conduct falls within the scope of employment if: “(1) it is of the kind [the employee] is employed to *343 perform; (2) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and (3) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.” Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 40 (2004).

Determining whether Hallam’s earning capacity was, in fact, impaired as a result of the injury caused by the defendants’ conduct and to what degree involved more than simple mathematical calculations, cf. Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 46 (2004), and it was not within the jury’s realm of common knowledge and everyday experience.

Mihos, 358 F.3d at 102; see also Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 48 (2004) (setting out test from Mihos).

Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30 (2004).

[r]ather, the adverse working conditions must generally be ongoing, repetitive, pervasive, and severe.” Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30,42 (2004) (quotations omitted).

Punitive damages are not allowed in New Hampshire, Aubert, 129 N.H. at 431, unless authorized by statute, see, e.g., Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 46 (2004) (punitive damages permitted in actions brought under 42 U.S.C.

“In superior court, a party is entitled to disclosure of the opposing party’s experts, the substance of the facts and opinions about which they are expected to testify and the basis of [their] opinions.” Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 54 (2004); see Super.

Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 48 (2004) (citing Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2004)).

Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 41 (2004).

“When reviewing the denial of a motion for summary judgment, we consider the pleadings and any accompanying affidavits, and all proper *521 inferences drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 40 (2004).