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In Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393 (2003), we held that for purposes of apportionment under the statute, the term “parties” included settling parties.

We must presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions, which precluded the jury from allowing the plaintiffs to “recover more than once for the same loss.” See Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393, 403 (2003).

Following this amendment, we had occasion to consider whether RSA 507:7-e permits a jury to apportion fault between a settling tortfeasor and a non-settling tortfeasor.

Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393, 395 (2003) (‘We do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme.”).

Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393, 395, 839 A.2d 25 (2003) ("We do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme.").

Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393, 400 (2003); Rawson, 125 N.H. at 99.

Nepomnayshy and Mahon under RSA 507:7-e, 1(c) (1997); and (2) Dr. Kleeman failed to adduce adequate evidence to apportion fault to non-litigants pursuant to our holdings in Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393 (2003), and DeBenedetto v. CLD Consulting Eng’rs, 153 N.H. 793 (2006).

Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393, 402, 839 A.2d 25 (2003) (quotation omitted).

“A contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a jury instruction issue for appellate review.” Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393, 402 (2003) (quotation omitted).

He also contended that common law did not support including him in the litigation as an indispensable party, and that Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393 (2003), did not permit the joinder of a settling party.

RSA 507:7-h, therefore, entitles a non-settling tortfeasor to a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the amount of the judgment equal to the consideration the plaintiff received from a good faith settlement with one of two or more tortfeasors.

Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393, 395 (2003) (framework includes RSA 507:7-d (1997) through RSA 507:7-i (1997)).

Furthermore, the jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions.

We ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words the legislature used.

We note that we do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme.

We further note that we do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme.

“other facilities” meaningless and that the term is “a catchall phrase that is intended to include various types of crossings, such as those that go over or under railroad tracks, which provides the statute with flexibility to change with changing circumstances and times.” • “In matters of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent.” Nilsson v. Bierman, 150 N.H. 393, 395 (2003).

In matters of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.

The purpose of jury instructions is to identify issues of material fact, and to inform the jury of the appropriate standards of law by which it is to resolve them.

We further note that we do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme.

We review jury instructions in context and will not reverse unless the charge, taken in its entirety, fails to adequately explain the law applicable to the case in such a way that the jury is misled.